Precedent, Non-Universal Injunctions, and Judicial Departmentalism: A Model of Constitutional Adjudication by Wasserman, Howard
Florida International University College of Law 
eCollections 
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 
2020 
Precedent, Non-Universal Injunctions, and Judicial 
Departmentalism: A Model of Constitutional Adjudication 
Howard Wasserman 
Florida International University College of Law, howard.wasserman@fiu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Howard M. Wasserman, Precedent, Non-Universal Injunctions, and Judicial Departmentalism: A Model of 
Constitutional Adjudication, 23 Lewis & CLARK L. REV. 1077 (2020). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at eCollections. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCollections. For more information, 
please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu. 
DATE DOWNLOADED: Wed Sep  9 16:31:59 2020
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
			                                                                
Howard M. Wasserman, Precedent, Non-Universal Injunctions, and Judicial
Departmentalism: A Model of Constitutional Adjudication, 23 Lewis & CLARK L. REV.
1077 (2020).                                                                         
ALWD 6th ed.                                                                         
Wasserman, H. M., Precedent, non-universal injunctions, and judicial departmentalism:
A model of constitutional adjudication, 23(4) Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1077 (2020).     
APA 7th ed.                                                                          
Wasserman, H. M. (2020). Precedent, non-universal injunctions, and judicial
departmentalism: model of constitutional adjudication. Lewis & Clark Law Review,
23(4), 1077-1148.                                                                    
Chicago 7th ed.                                                                      
Howard M. Wasserman, "Precedent, Non-Universal Injunctions, and Judicial
Departmentalism: A Model of Constitutional Adjudication," Lewis & Clark Law Review
23, no. 4 (2020): 1077-1148                                                          
McGill Guide 9th ed.                                                                 
Howard M Wasserman, "Precedent, Non-Universal Injunctions, and Judicial
Departmentalism: A Model of Constitutional Adjudication" (2020) 23:4 Lewis & Clark L
Rev 1077.                                                                            
MLA 8th ed.                                                                          
Wasserman, Howard M. "Precedent, Non-Universal Injunctions, and Judicial
Departmentalism: A Model of Constitutional Adjudication." Lewis & Clark Law Review,
vol. 23, no. 4, 2020, p. 1077-1148. HeinOnline.                                      
OSCOLA 4th ed.                                                                       
Howard M Wasserman, 'Precedent, Non-Universal Injunctions, and Judicial
Departmentalism: A Model of Constitutional Adjudication' (2020) 23 Lewis & Clark L
Rev 1077
Provided by: 
FIU College of Law
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and 
   Conditions of the license agreement available at 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from  uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your  license, please use:
Copyright Information
ARTICLES
PRECEDENT, NON-UNIVERSAL INJUNCTIONS, AND JUDICIAL




This Article proposes a model of constitutional adjudication that offers a
deeper, richer, and more accurate vision than the simple "courts strike down
unconstitutional laws" narrative that pervades legal, popular, and political
discourse around constitutional litigation. The model rests on five principles:
1) an actionable constitutional violation arises from the actual or threatened
enforcement ofan invalid law, not the existence of the law itself 2) the remedy
when a law is constitutionally invalid is for the court to halt enforcement; 3)
remedies must be particularized to the parties to a case and courts should not
issue "universal" or "nationwide" injunctions; 4) a judgment controls the par-
ties to the case, while the courts opinion creates precedent o resolve future
cases; and 5) rather than judicial supremacy, federal courts operate on a model
of 'judicial departmentalism, " in which executive and legislative officials must
abide by judgments in particular cases, but exercise independent interpretive
authority as to constitutional meaning, even where those interpretations con-
flict with judicial understanding. The synthesis ofthesefveprinciplesproduces
a constitutional system defined by the following features: 1) the judgment in
one case declaring a law invalid prohibits enforcement of the law as to the
parties to the case; 2) the challenged law remains on the books; and 3) the
challenged law may be enforced against non-parties to the original case, but
Professor of Law, FIU College of Law. Thanks to Thomas Baker, Samuel Bray, Andrew-
Aaron Bruhl, Scott Dodson, Michael Froomkin, Michael Morley, James Pfander, Andrew Wright,
and participants in programs at University of Colorado Law School, University of Miami School
of Law, and the Southeastern Association of Law Schools.
1077
1078 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:4
systemic and institutional incentives weigh against such enforcement efforts
and push towards compliance with judicial understandings.
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INTRODUCTION
The public, the media, political officials, and first-year law students understand
and describe constitutional adjudication along three ideas.
The first is judicial supremacy.1 The Supreme Court holds the final, uncon-
testable word on what the Constitution says and means, and all other actors must
yield to that judicial understanding; once the Court speaks on a constitutional issue,
the only way to change is a constitutional amendment. This derives from Marbury
v. Madison's declaration that it is "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is" 2 as well as language in Cooper v. Aaron seeking
to enforce school desegregation.3 The second is what Jonathan Mitchell calls the
"writ-of-erasure fallacy"-the erroneous understanding that a court acts against a
constitutionally invalid law, "striking down," "blocking," "setting aside," "halting,"
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST.
COMMENT. 455, 456 (2000) [hereinafter Alexander & Schauer, Defending]; Larry Alexander &
Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1359
(1997) [hereinafter Alexander & Schauer, ExtrajudicialJ; Josh Blackman, The Irrepressible Myth of
Cooper v. Aaron, 107 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1137 (2019); Kevin C. Walsh, Judicial Departmentalism:
An Introduction, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1713, 1715 (2017).
2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); Alexander & Schauer, Defending, supra note 1,
at 456; Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial, supra note 1, at 1359; Blackman, supra note 1, at
1137.
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or "voiding" that law, rendering it null and void for all purposes, erased from exist-
ence, and no longer effective as "law."4 These combine into a third idea: An uncon-
stitutional law disappears and the political branches are disabled from acting in some
area absent a constitutional amendment or the Court overruling its precedent.
The reality of constitutional adjudication is more complicated and more
bound-up in sub-constitutional features of judicial and political procedure and in
inter-branch norms. Marbury establishes that the Court has a duty and power to
declare the law in the course of deciding cases, which does not support the broader
principle that the Court has the final power to declare the law.5 And invalidating or
striking down a law is not a recognized or permissible judicial remedy.6
Properly conceptualized, constitutional adjudication rests on five controlling
principles, which I summarize here and describe in detail throughout the Article:
* A judicially remediable violation of constitutional rights arises from ex-
ecutive action in the actual or threatened enforcement of a law7 against an
individual. The enactment or existence of a law, apart from enforcement,
does not state an actionable violation.
* Constitutionally defective laws do not disappear or cease to be law fol-
lowing a judicial ruling. Courts cannot repeal or eliminate a law, and a
law remains on the books until repealed by the relevant legislature. The
Court's declaration of constitutional invalidity means the law cannot be
enforced by the relevant executive-branch officials; it does not mean the
law ceases to take effect or ceases to to exist once it has taken effect.
* Judicial remedies are particularized to the parties. A judgment resolving
a discrete case or controversy between parties controls the conduct of the
defendant and those closely connected to the defendant. That judgment
protects the rights-holders who are party to the specific case but extends
no further. Injunctions prohibiting enforcement of a law should not be
"universal" or "non-particularized"8 to protect parties and similarly situ-
ated non-parties alike; orders must be particularized to the parties to the
Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 VA. L. REv. 933, 934-37 (2018);
Howard M. Wasserman, "Nationwide"Injunctions Are Really "Universal"Injunctions and They Are
Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 358-59 (2018).
5 Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REv. 1267, 1273-74 (1996).
6 John Harrison, Severability, Remedies, and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 56, 88 (2014); Mitchell, supra note 4, at 942; Wasserman, supra note 4, at 356-57.
7 In using "law" throughout the Article, I mean all enforceable legal rules regardless of
source-statutes, administrative regulations and policies, executive policies, and judge-made
common law.
8 Throughout the Article, I describe injunctions in pairs: universal/non-particularized and
[Vol. 23:41080
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case. The scope of the remedy has been a point of significant recent aca-
demic9 and judicialo dispute.
* The judgment resolving a discrete case or controversy is distinct from
the opinion in which the court explains and justifies that judgment. That
distinction establishes downstream distinctions in how each is put into
practice and effect. A judgment is controlled by the law of judgments and
preclusion, allowing the parties to enjoy the benefits and bear the burdens
of resolved litigation and to enforce the court's judgment going forward.
The opinion operates through the law of precedent and through its bind-
ing or persuasive effect on future courts resolving future cases or contro-
versies raising similar legal issues among different parties.I
non-universal/particularized. I previously adopted "universal" as the preferred and more accurate
term, Wasserman, supra note 4, at 349-53, as did Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion in
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 n.1 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Rodgers v.
Bryant 942 F.3d 451, 460 & n.5 (8th Cit. 2019) (Stras, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Howard M. Wasserman, Nomenclature Matters: Universal Injunctions, Declaratory
Judments, Opinions, and Precedent, 91 U. COLO. L. REv. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 6-
7). Most courts continue to use "nationwide." Eg, Californiav. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 583-84 (9th
Cir. 2018). My new preference distinguishes injunctions that are "particularized" to the parties
from "non-particularized" orders protecting non-parties; this reaches orders that are not universal
(because they do not protect everyone in the universe of enforcement argets) but do impermissibly
protect beyond the parties to the case. Wasserman, supra (manuscript at 6-7).
9 For scholars arguing that injunctions cannot protect beyond the parties to the case, see
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 276 (4th ed. 2010); Samuel L. Bray,
Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 418, 469 (2017);
Ronald A. Cass, Nationwide Injunctions' Governance Problems: Forum-Shopping, Politicizing
Courts, and Eroding Constitutional Structure, 27 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 4-5) (on file with author); Michael T. Morley, Disaggregating Nationwide
Injunctions, 71 ALA. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2019) [hereinafter Morley, Disaggregating]; Michael T.
Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts, 97
B.U. L. REv. 615, 620-21 (2017) [hereinafter Morley, Nationwide Injunctions]; Wasserman, supra
note 4, at 353; Wasserman, supra note 8 (manuscript at 1-2). For scholars arguing that universal
or non-particularized injunctions can protect beyond the parties, at least in some cases, see Zachary
D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 MICH. L. REv. 1, 5-7 (2019); Amanda
Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1065, 1069 (2018); Suzette M.
Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 56
(2017); James E. Pfander & Jacob Wentzel, The Common Law Origins ofEx Parte Young, STAN.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 56-57); Alan M. Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide
Injunctions, 98 TEX. L. REV. 67, 72-73 (2019).
0 Compare Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2424-25 (Thomas, J., concurring), with id. at 2446 n.13
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting); compare California v. Health & Human Servs., 351 F. Supp. 3d 1267,
1300 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff'd941 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2019), with Pennsylvania v. President United
States, 930 F.3d 543, 575-76 (3d Cir. 2019).
" Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 915,
2020] 1081
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* Constitutional adjudication operates on what Kevin Walsh labels "judi-
cial departmentalism."l2 Under judicial departmentalism: (1) the federal
executive must enforce judicial judgments and orders;13 (2) governments
and government officers (federal, state, or local) who are parties to an ac-
tion are bound to obey a judgment entered against them;14 and (3) judicial
precedent controls courts (the extent of control depends on the issuing
court and varies between binding and persuasive authority) but not legis-
lative and executive actors, who remain free to act on their own under-
standings, interpretations, and judgments about the Constitution and the
constitutional validity of laws.'5
The synthesis of these five principles produces a system of constitutional adju-
dication that can be framed as follows:
* A court, having declared a law constitutionally invalid, enters a judgment
binding on the parties to the action, stopping, enjoining, or prohibiting
enforcement of that law by the defendant government as to the rights-
holders who are party to the case. The government is barred, on pain of
contempt,'6 from further enforcement of the law as to the opposing par-
ties. And the judgment has some preclusive effect on future enforcement
efforts.
* The challenged law remains on the books. The executive may enforce
that law against others not protected by the judgment if the executive con-
tinues to believe the law is constitutionally valid, even in the face of con-
trary judicial precedent. The legislature may keep the law on the books
regardless of what judicial precedent says about its validity. Any legislature
can enact or reenact an identical law contrary to judicial precedent.
* New legislative or enforcement efforts will land in court. When they do,
courts are bound or persuaded by precedent to reach the same conclusion
about the constitutional validity of the law and to enjoin or prohibit en-
923 n.31 (2011) [hereinafter Fallon, Fact]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-AppliedandFacialChallenges
and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1321, 1339 (2000) [hereinafter Fallon, As-AppliedJ;
Adam N. Steinman, Case Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1947, 1957 (2017); Walsh, supra note 1, at 1727-
28.
12 Walsh, supra note 1, at 1715.
13 Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1321.
4 William Baude, The Jument Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1809-10 (2008); Walsh, supra
note 1, at 1726.
" Baude, supra note 14, at 1809-10; Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1328; Walsh, supra
note 1, at 1726.
16 Cass, supra note 9 (manuscript at 10-11).
[Vol. 23:41082
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forcement of the law as to new parties. Alternatively, the court may over-
rule precedent, declaring the law valid and permitting its enforcement.
This model provides a more accurate understanding of the waves of constitu-
tional litigation we have seen in recent years challenging laws governing and restrict-
ing immigration,1 7 same-sex marriage,'8 and abortion.19 It offers a better way of
thinking and talking about constitutional adjudication and about enforcing and vin-
dicating constitutional rights. It understands that all branches of government have
extensive and co-equal powers of constitutional interpretation. And it provides a
richer, more complicated, and more complete narrative than the simple story of
judicial supremacy and the Supreme Court "striking down" a law that disappears
for all purposes and as to all actors. Constitutional and legal dialogue is richer for
the more accurate description of the process.
This Article proceeds as follows. Parts I through V describe and elaborate on
the five principles identified above. Part VI then describes how this process works
in a generic case.
I. PRINCIPLE ONE: CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION IN THE
ENFORCEMENT
An actionable violation of the Constitution is triggered not by the enactment
or existence of a violative law, but by the actual, attempted, or threatened enforce-
ment of that law. That is, a plaintiff cannot sue because the legislature enacts or
retains a law; constitutional litigation comes in response to government efforts to
enforce that law. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the Court stated that it could not act
in response to the "naked contention that Congress has usurped the reserved powers
of the several States by the mere enactment of the statute," where "nothing has been
" Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403 (2018); City of San Francisco v. Trump, 897
F. 3d 1225, 1231 (9th Cir. 2018); State of New York v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d
213, 220-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 936 (N.D. Ill.
2017); Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enft, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1136 (S.D. Cal.
2018). See generally Wasserman, supra note 4.
" See Josh Blackman & Howard M. Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, 43
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 243, 243 (2016); Howard M. Wasserman, Crazy in Alabama: Judicial
Process and the Last StandAgainst Marriage Equality in the Land of George Wallace, 110 Nw. U. L.
REv. ONLINE 1, 1 (2015); see also, e.g., Miller v. Caudill, 936 F.3d 442, 446 (6th Cit. 2019).
19 Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016); E.M.W. Women's
Surgical Center v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 423 (6th Cir. 2019); Jackson Women's Health Org. v.
Dobbs, 379 F. Supp. 3d 549, 551 (S.D. Miss. 2019). See generally Sabrina Tavernise, 'The Time
Is Now' States Are Rushing to Restrict Abortion, Or to Protect It, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/us/abortion-laws-2019.html.
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done and nothing is to be done" to enforce that statute against someone.20
Descriptively, this is framed as Article III standing. A plaintiff has Article III
standing to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief barring enforcement of a law only
by showing that she suffers ongoing, impending, or substantially likely harm or in-
jury from the actual or threatened enforcement of the challenged law against her.21
The existence of the law, without a credible threat of enforcement of that law against
her, is insufficient to confer standing.22 That the existing law might "chill" an indi-
vidual from exercising her constitutional rights will not confer standing absent that
credible threat of enforcement.23 That the existing law sends a negative "message"
does not confer standing absent real or potential enforcement.24 Threats of enforce-
ment against persons other than the plaintiff are insufficient to confer standing on
that plaintiff2 ' as are generalized threats of enforcement against the public as a whole
that are not specific or unique to the plaintiff.26
In addition, whether the plaintiff sues the wrong defendant is framed as con-
stitutional standing. If the named defendant is not the government official respon-
sible for enforcing the challenged law, the injury is not fairly traceable to that de-
fendant, thus a judicial order directed to that defendant will not resolve or redress
the injury caused by enforcement of that law.27
In deciding whether the plaintiff faces an imminent threat of enforcement,
courts consider whether the federal pre-enforcement plaintiff could be prosecuted
20 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 483 (1923).
21 Michael T. Morley, DeFacto Class Actions? Plaintiff and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions
in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 487,
523-35 (2016) [hereinafter Morley, DeFacto Class Actions]; see, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v.
Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2342 (2014); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02
(1983).
22 Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2342; Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S.
289, 298 (1979).
23 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
24 Plaintiffs can claim an injury to challenge government practices, such as school prayers or
religious displays, that violate the Establishment Clause by sending a "message" to non-believers
that they are less-than-full members of the community. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530
U.S. 290, 309 (2000); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
But those cases involve challenges to government execution of a prayer or religious display, not an
unenforced policy permitting such prayers or displays. And two Justices have questioned
"offended observer" standing, even in Establishment Clause cases. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist
Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2098 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
25 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105.
26 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974).
27 Cf Common Cause v. Biden, 748 F.3d 1280, 1284-85 (D.C. Cit. 2014); Brenner v.
Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1286 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
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or subject to enforcement of the challenged statute in light of the facts of the plain-
tiff s intended conduct. The standing analysis in the pre-enforcement action predicts
the executive enforcement decisions by mirroring the analysis that would apply in
the enforcement action-whether the law applies to this individual and her conduct
and whether the government might seek to enforce the law against such conduct by
this individual.
Normatively, Judge William Fletcher argues that standing is better understood
as an inquiry about the substantive merits. Asking whether a plaintiff has suffered
an injury-in-fact-the first element of the standing analysis-really asks whether the
plaintiffs legally recognized and legally protected rights have been violated.2 8 The
lynchpin of Fletcher's argument is his insistence that there is no such thing as an
objective, neutral injury-in-fact divorced from some external, normative source of
law establishing rights and duties that define when someone has been injured.29 The
relevant question is not whether an actual injury occurred in the abstract, but
whether it is an injury that the courts should recognize because the substantive stat-
utory or constitutional law recognizes it as one that can be vindicated and enforced
in a particular case.30
Fletcherian analysis leads to the same conclusion as standing analysis. The con-
stitutional merits stand or fall on the actual or threatened enforcement of a consti-
tutionally defective law against that individual. Constitutional litigation seeks to
stop enforcement of that constitutionally defective law against an individual because
the Article III injury or substantive constitutional violation arises from that enforce-
ment. Constitutional litigation does not and cannot stop the law itself because the
law itself neither inflicts the injury needed for standing nor imposes the substantive
constitutional violation. Absent some actual or threatened enforcement, there can
be no injury and no constitutional claim.
II. PRINCIPLE TWO: COURTS HALT ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW,
NOT THE LAW ITSELF
A. The Process of Constitutional Litigation
Because the constitutional injury and violation arise from enforcement of the
28 William A. Fletcher, Standing: Who Can Sue to Enforce a Legal Duty?, 65 ALA. L. REV.
277, 282 (2013) [hereinafter Fletcher, Standing]; William A. Fletcher, The Structure ofStanding,
98 YALE L.J. 221, 223, 232-33 (1988) [hereinafter Fletcher, Structure]; Howard M. Wasserman,
Fletcherian Standing, Merits, and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 257, 258-
59 (2015).
29 Fletcher, Structure, supra note 28, at 231.
30 Id. at 231-32, 234; Fletcher, Standing, supra note 28, at 281.
2020] 1085
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challenged law, it follows that the remedy must stop enforcement of a constitution-
ally defective law rather than erase the law itself.
Constitutional defects in laws may be raised and litigated in four contexts.
1. Defensive
Government initiates proceedings to enforce a law against X, a rights-holder,
who raises the constitutional defect in the law as a defense to enforcement. Enforce-
ment proceedings may be criminal, '3 1 civil, 32 or administrative.33 A rights-holder de-
fendant also may raise constitutional defenses to laws enforced through private civil
litigation.34
2. Offensive, Prospective
Prior to initiation of an enforcement action against X, X sues the government
or (more commonly) the executive officials responsible for enforcing the law in fed-
eral court, seeking a declaratory judgment 3 5 that the law is constitutionally invalid
and cannot be enforced against X and/or an injunction prohibiting enforcement of
that law against X.36
This is often labeled an Ex Parte Young action.37 In many cases, the action
produces an anti-suit injunction, with the court issuing a prohibitory (or negative)
injunction prohibiting the defendant official from initiating a judicial proceeding to
enforce the law against the rights-holder.38 But Ex Parte Young pre-enforcement lit-
igation extends to enforcement of all laws, regardless of how the defendant executive
would enforce that law.39 In either procedural context, the federal court, presented
31 Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 214 (2011); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460,
466-67 (2010); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02, 608 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
32 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 749-52 (2013); cf Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592, 604-05 (1975).
1 Middlesex Cry. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
' Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 450 (2011); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241, 243 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964); Skrzypczak v.
Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cit. 2010).
3 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2012).
3 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union,
521 U.S. 844, 861-62 (1997); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975); Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 454 (1974).
37 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167-68 (1908).
- Va. Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 262 (2011) (Kennedy,
J., concurring); Bray, supra note 9, at 449-50; John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV.
989, 990, 1014-15 (2008).
* Stewart, 563 U.S. at 256-57; see, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532,
1536 (2018); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 936 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Miller v.
Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 933-34 (E.D. Ky. 2015); Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 9
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with the argument that the law is constitutionally defective, interprets the Consti-
tution and decides whether the underlying law exceeds internal limits on the gov-
ernment's power to enact,laws (such as the Commerce Clause or federalism limits)
40
or external limits on the government's power arising from individual-rights provi-
sions (such as the First or Fourteenth Amendments).4 '
A court may grant a declaratory judgment alone or alongside an injunction,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought.42 Or the declaratory judgment
can form the basis for a later injunction against the party whose rights had been
declared.43 Congress enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934.44 In Steffel v.
Thompson, the Supreme Court explained the remedy as a delayed reaction to the
"storm of controversy" that followed Ex Parte Young, reflecting congressional hos-
tility to federal district courts preventing state and federal governments from enforc-
ing their laws.45 A declaratory judgment offered a "milder alternative" to the "strong
medicine" of an injunction.46 It was less intrusive on states and political branches
because the court did not prohibit enforcement of the law. It was less coercive be-
cause it was not immediately enforceable through contempt if the government de-
fendant disregarded the order.47 Declaratory judgments operate through persuasion,
convincing government defendants to follow a course of action by the force of the
court's reasoning.
If persuasion does not work and coercion becomes necessary, the declaratory
judgment can form the basis for a subsequent injunction, although the injunction
at least requires an additional step and additional time. In fact, many plaintiffs seek
pre-enforcement injunctions where the primary motive is to obtain the declaration
of rights that a declaratory judgment provides.48
Samuel Bray rejects the thesis that "mildness" represents the distinction be-
tween injunctions and declaratory judgments. A declaratory judgment is a court
(manuscript at 49).
40 Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 214 (2011); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 601-02 (2000).
4 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608; United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481-82 (2010);
Reno, 521 U.S. at 849; Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
42 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012).
4 Id. § 2202; Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1971).
* Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466-67 (1974).
* Id. at 465-67.
46 Id
47 Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111-12 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Cass, supra note 9 (manuscript at 49).
48 EMILY SHERWIN & SAMUEL L. BRAY, AMES, CHAFEE, AND RE ON REMEDIES, CASES AND
MATERIALS (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 17-18).
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order. The judicial declaration that a law should not be enforced against an individ-
ual frees the individual to engage in constitutionally protected conduct without fear
of enforcement; it is of no matter that the judgment does not command non-en-
forcement of the law on threat of contempt.49 The real distinction between the rem-
edies is the greater detail the court must include in an injunction, allowing it to
manage the parties and their conduct going forward. Declaratory judgments require
less detail and less party management, allowing the court to pronounce rights with-
out more.50
Choosing between an injunction and a declaratory judgment thus depends on
the scope and needs of the case-whether ongoing court supervision and manage-
ment is necessary. An injunction is essential in a structural-reform case, where the
purpose of litigation is judicially managed, detailed, and specific reform of govern-
ment institutions such as schools or prisons.5 ' A declaratory judgment may be suf-
ficient in the one-off case in which an individual seeks to stop enforcement of a
constitutionally invalid law but does not require broader judicial oversight52 -or
can wait to obtain judicial oversight when it becomes clear the declaratory remedy
is insufficient. Courts may regard the declaration of rights as sufficient because the
government "will do their duty when disputed questions have been finally adjudi-
cated and the rights and liabilities of the parties have been finally determined."5 3
3. Offensive, Retroactive
A rights-holder can bring an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 198354 for
past constitutional injuries caused by state or local officials5 5 or municipalities56 or
under Bivens v. Six Unknown NamedAgents for past constitutional injuries caused
by federal officials. 57 Rather than stopping enforcement, these lawsuits seek retro-
active remedies, primarily damages, after government officials have taken or at-
tempted constitutionally defective enforcement efforts, including enforcing a con-
stitutionally defective law against a rights-holder. The damages remedy compensates
the plaintiffs for the past injury, deters continued or future enforcement efforts, and
49 Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judment, 63 DuKE L.J. 1091, 1120-
21 (2014).
o Id. at 1124-25.
5' Id. at 1128; see, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 545 (2011).
52 Bray, supra note 49, at 1124-25.
53 Martin v. Gross, 380 F. Supp. 3d 169, 172 (D. Mass. 2019).
54 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serys., 436 U.S. 658, 663, 701 (1978);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961).
5 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171-72.
56 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
5 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 (2017); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
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holds government officials accountable for past misconduct." Defendants in such
damages actions may include police officers who arrested the plaintiff for violating
the constitutionally defective law5 9 or other executive officials charged with enforc-
ing the law outside of the courts.60
4. Federal Government
Although less-frequently wielded, the federal government can initiate crimi-
nal61 or Civil 62 proceedings against state and local governments and government of-
ficials to protect individuals' federal constitutional and statutory rights against mis-
conduct by state and local governments and officials. These efforts allow vindication
of individual rights where defendants may be immune from private suit.
6 3
B. The Results of Constitutional Litigation
Each procedure described in Part II.A produces the same result if the court
agrees that the law is constitutionally defective-a judgment declaring the law con-
stitutionally invalid and a remedy prohibiting or deterring continued and future
enforcement of that law as to the parties to the action (or redressing injury from past
enforcement). Regardless of remedy, the results of the cases should have the same
scope.
Court are often described as acting upon the law itself. And the court's action
against the law is described in violent terms. Courts "invalidate" or "strike down"
or "set aside" or "nullify" or "block" or "void" or "halt" or "stop" these laws, pre-
venting them from taking effect or eliminating and rendering them non-existent.
64
Jonathan Mitchell labels this the "writ-of-erasure fallacy," the "assumption that a
judicial pronouncement of unconstitutionality has canceled or blotted out a duly
enacted statute, when the court's ruling is in fact more limited in scope and leaves
room for the statute to continue to operate."6 5 The challenged law or policy is un-
derstood as suspended or revoked or vetoed or blocked, with judges, politicians, and
58 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267-68 (1981); Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
59 Snider v. City of Cape Girardeau, 752 F.3d 1149, 1156 (8th Cir. 2014).
6 Ernold v. Davis, 936 F.3d 429, 432-33 (6th Cir. 2019)
61 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012); id. § 241; United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271-72 (1997).
62 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (2012).
63 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
* Bray, supra note 9, at 451-52; Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, One Good Plaintiffis Not Enough,
67 DuKE L.J. 481, 552 (2017); Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 11, at 1339; Frost, supra note 9, at
1100; Mitchell, supra note 4, at 934-35.
65 Mitchell, supra note 4, at 937.
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the public regarding "judicially disapproved statute[s]" as legal nullities.66 This po-
sition finds support in the loose language of Marbury that a law "repugnant to the
Constitution" becomes "entirely void." 67
But this conception is erroneous. As the Court explained in Massachusetts v.
Mellon:
We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground
that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when
the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a
justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act. Then the power exercised
is that of ascertaining and declaring the law applicable to the controversy. It
amounts to little more than the negative power to disregard an unconstitu-
tional enactment, which otherwise would stand in the way of the enforcement
of a legal right.68
A court cannot apply a constitutionally defective law as a rule of decision in the
instant case or controversy, as the Marbury Court refused to enforce Section 25 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 and exercise jurisdiction over Marbury's action.69 In an
enforcement action, the court cannot enforce the law at issue; with no law to apply,
the court must dismiss the enforcement action or otherwise find in favor of the
defendant rights-holder.7 0 In a pre-enforcement Ex Parte Young action, the court
enjoins the defendant officer from enforcing the challenged law, prohibiting its fu-
ture use as a rule of decision in a future case or controversy.
But federal courts cannot act on the law itself. As Mitchell argues, "federal
courts have no authority to erase a duly enacted law from the statute books, and
they have no power to veto or suspend a statute."71 Invalidation is not a recognized
judicial remedy: "Courts do not invalidate statutory rules in a literal sense, and
therefore do not, strictly speaking, grant a remedy that makes a statutory provision
ineffective."7 2 The target of the lawsuit is the person of the enforcing-official de-
fendant, not the law as a res.73
Courts also cannot stop a law from taking effect, repeal a law, or order the
,6 Id. at 944.
67 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
6 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
69 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176-80.
70 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481-82 (2010); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
420 (1989); Mitchell, supra note 4, at 936.
n Mitchell, supra note 4, at 936.
72 Harrison, supra note 6, at 88.
7 Walsh, supra note 1, at 1725.
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legislature to repeal the law; all require an independent legislative act.74 But legisla-
tors are not parties to litigation challenging the constitutional validity of laws-the
government or the responsible executive officials are the named parties and the only
ones subject to a judicial remedy. Nor can litigants sue to force repeal. Federal, state,
and local legislators enjoy absolute immunity from suit or liability for legislative acts,
including enacting or repealing legislation.75 A court cannot order legislators to en-
gage in the legislative actions of repealing or refraining from enacting laws.
That a law has been declared constitutionally invalid and its enforcement pro-
hibited does not absolve rights-holders of their legal obligations under that statute
so long as the statute remains on the books in effect.76 Rather, a rights-holder has
(or can gain, through future litigation and future remedies) judicial protection (or
promise of judicial protection) against enforcement of that law and that legal obli-
gation. For example, having convinced a court that the state prohibition on flag
desecration violates the First Amendment, X is protected from conviction for his act
of flag desecration,7 7 as will be Y who, subsequent o that judicial determination,
desecrates a flag.7 8
III. PRINCIPLE THREE: PARTICULARIZED REMEDIES
A. Remedies Particularized to the Parties
A court enters a judgment7 9 to resolve the case or controversy before it-to
announce who wins and who loses, to announce the appropriate remedies, and to
establish the rights, duties, and obligations of the parties going forward. William
Baude argues that the root of the judicial power under Article III is the authority to
"issue binding judgments and to settle legal disputes within the court's jurisdiction.
But judgments settle only those legal disputes, not others."80
This judicial remedy is particularized to the litigation at issue and therefore to
the parties to that litigation. 8 The judgment and order that the court issues binds
the parties to the action as to the law and facts in the case, resolving their dispute.
And the court's power to enforce that order, including by holding disobedient or
7 Brookins v. O'Bannon, 699 F.2d 648, 655 n.16 (3d Cit. 1983).
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1; Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 46 (1998); Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972).
76 Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1008; Walsh, supra note 1, at 1726.
n Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989).
78 Snider v. City of Cape Girardeau, 752 F.3d 1149, 1156 (8th Cir. 2014).
7 FED. R. Civ. P. 58.
8o Baude, supra note 14, at 1811; accord Robert. J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers ofFederal
Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOwA L. REv. 735, 860 (2001).
" Baude, supra note 14, at 1811; Pushaw, supra note 80, at 860.
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non-compliant parties in contempt of court,82 is limited to the parties to the action
and to the law and facts in the case.
This is obvious in an enforcement action. Imagine the government initiates
proceedings to enforce a law against X, X defends on the ground that the law is
inconsistent with the Constitution, and the court agrees with X that the law is con-
stitutionally invalid and cannot be enforced as the rule of decision in the case. The
court dismisses and enters judgment in favor of X and against the government that
brought the enforcement action. But this judgment goes no further, speaking to no
person other than X. And no one believes or argues otherwise. The judgment does
not prohibit the government from initiating a new enforcement action against Y. It
does not prohibit a different government from initiating an action in its courts to
enforce a similar law against X, Y, or any other person. It may not prohibit the same
government from initiating a new enforcement action against X for violating a dif-
ferent law or for violating the same law on a different set of facts arising from a
different transaction or occurrence.
It also is obvious in a retroactive action for damages. The plaintiff receives the
monetary award, no one else. Non-parties benefit indirectly from the deterrent ef-
fect of the judgment and damages award for the plaintiff-wanting to avoid future
damages judgments, governments and government officials will not engage in that
constitutionally violative behavior.
83
It follows that a judgment in a pre-enforcement action for declaratory or in-
junctive relief to halt future enforcement of the challenged law should be similarly
particularized, protecting the plaintiff but not non-parties. A pre-enforcement ac-
tion anticipates government enforcement, and the pre-enforcement remedy pre-
vents that attempt. The rights-holder's defensive effort to stop enforcement before
it begins is symmetrical to her defensive effort to defeat an ongoing enforcement
action. If the judgment in the enforcement action would be limited to the rights-
holder, the judgment in the pre-enforcement action should go no further. The goal
of both actions is to halt enforcement of the challenged law-if one is particularized
to one rights-holder, so should the other.
Thus, Bray argues that a "federal court should give an injunction that protects
the plaintiff vis-i-vis the defendant, wherever the plaintiff and the defendant may
both happen to be. The injunction should not constrain the defendant's conduct
vis-h-vis nonparties."84 Douglas Laycock similarly argues that "the court in an indi-
vidual action should not globally prohibit a government agency from enforcing an
invalid regulation; the court should order only that the invalid regulation not be
82 Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1977); Reynolds v. Roberts, 207 F.3d 1288, 1297
(11th Cir. 2000).
8 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
84 Bray, supra note 9, at 469.
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enforced against the individual plaintiff. 85 John Harrison agrees:
When a court enjoins an officer from enforcing a statutory rule, the effect is
similar to the repeal of the rule as far as the plaintiff is concerned. When a
court declares that a statutory rule is not applicable to a party because the rule
is unconstitutional, the declaratory judgment again resembles a judicial act of
invalidation with respect to the parties involved."
The Supreme Court endorsed this position in Doran v. Salem Inn, stating, "neither
declaratory nor injunctive relief can directly interfere with enforcement of contested
statutes or ordinances except with respect to the particular federal plaintiffs, and the
State is free to prosecute others who may violate the statute."87 The Court could
have added that other states and officers of other states remain free to enforce their
similar laws against anyone who violates those laws.
This insistence on particularity abuts the recent controversy over universal or
non-particularized injunctions, with courts issuing injunctions in pre-enforcement
actions that prohibit or purport to prohibit enforcement of the challenged laws not
only against the named plaintiffs, but also against all or some similarly situated non-
parties who might be subject to enforcement of those challenged laws.89 These in-
junctions attempt to prohibit government officials from enforcing the challenged
laws against the universe of all persons and entities rather than only the named
plaintiffs. Justices Gorsuch and Thomas separately recognized the problem as in-
junctions that "prohibit the Government from enforcing a policy with respect to
anyone, including nonparties"90 and are "not limited to relief for the parties at issue"
by striking down "a federal statute with regard to anybody anywhere in the world." 91
Legal scholars are divided between those who argue that Article III and equity re-
quire injunctions to be particularized to the parties and those who argue that courts
have broader equitable remedial powers.92
Mitchell's writ-of-erasure fallacy93 illustrates why remedies should be particu-
larized rather than universal/non-particularized. The constitutional violation is nei-
ther the enactment nor existence of the unconstitutional law, thus the remedy is not
85 LAYCOCK, supra note 9, at 276.
86 Harrison, supra note 6, at 87.
87 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975).
" See supra note 8.
89 Bray, supra note 9, at 419. Compare California v. Health & Human Servs., 351 F. Supp.
3d 1267, 1300 (N.D. Cal. 2019), affd 941 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2019), with Pennsylvania v.
President United States, 930 F.3d 543, 575-76 (3d Cir. 2019).
90 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 n.1 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
' Transcript of Oral Argument at 73, Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965).
92 See sources cited supra note 9.
9 Mitchell, supra note 4, at 937.
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the erasure or voiding of the challenged law. The violation is the actual or threatened
enforcement of that law against particular persons, which can be remedied by a court
order stopping or preemptively prohibiting enforcement particularized to those per-
sons.
That narrower conception of the constitutional violation dictates the appropri-
ate scope of the pre-enforcement injunctive or declaratory remedy. The "scope of
injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the [constitutional] violation estab-
lished"94 and should be commensurate with and match the constitutional viola-
tion.95 A "remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the
injury in fact that the plaintiff has established."96 Injunctive "relief should be no
more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the
plaintiffs." 97 And the judicial remedy must benefit the plaintiff "in particular."98
If the violation is the actual, attempted, or threatened enforcement of the con-
stitutionally defective law by an executive official against a particular rights-holder,
an injunction prohibiting that official from enforcing that law against that particular
rights-holder matches and remedies, and is commensurate with, the constitutional
violation in the case. An injunction prohibiting enforcement of the challenged law
against the plaintiff, X, provides complete relief to X without imposing a greater
burden on the government defendant. That relief is not rendered less than complete
if the injunction does not prohibit the government from enforcing the law against
Y and if the government attempts to enforce that law against Y. Nor does X benefit
from an order protecting non-parties from enforcement, as that non-party enforce-
ment does not harm or affect X.
The requirement of particularity applies where the plaintiff seeks declaratory
relief only, without a corresponding injunction.99 Either remedy resolves a discrete
dispute between discrete parties to a discrete action and not beyond.10 0 A declaratory
judgment should be as particularized as an injunction, limited to declaring the rights
of the plaintiff as against the government defendant, but not extending to declaring
94 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979).
9 Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293-94 (1976).
96 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996).
9 Califano, 442 U.S. at 702; see also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,
778 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9' Kanuszewski v. Mich. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 927 F.3d 396, 426 (6th Cit.
2019) (Rogers, J., concurring).
9 Supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
'0 Bray, supra note 9, at 469; Cass, supra note 9 (manuscript at 5); Morley, Nationwide
Injunctions, supra note 9, at 616; Morley, Disaggregating, supra note 9, at 7-8; Wasserman, supra
note 4, at 353; Wasserman, supra note 8 (manuscript at 12-14).
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the rights of non-plaintiffs or to binding non-defendants. The declaration estab-
lishes that a constitutionally invalid law cannot be enforced against the plaintiff by
the defendant, providing what Harrison calls a "judicial act of invalidation with re-
spect to the parties involved,"o' but says nothing about the enforceability of that law
against non-parties.
This understanding is consistent with the text of the Declaratory Judgment
Act. Section 2201 empowers the court to declare the rights or legal relations "of any
interested party,"102 meaning the determination of rights is specific to the parties,
but cannot speak to the law, or its enforceability, in the abstract.0 3 Kevin Walsh's
argument about the nature of constitutional actions holds for declaratory relief-it
is an in personam claim to stop government officials from enforcing the law against
the plaintiff, not an in rem claim to stop the law itself.104
"Further necessary or proper relief," namely an injunction against the adverse
party, can follow if the declaration proves insufficient to protect the rights declared
against enforcement of the challenged law. 05 But only the plaintiff can seek that
further relief to protect her declared rights. X having obtained a declaratory judg-
ment, it would be incoherent to allow Y to use X's declaratory judgment to obtain
an injunction protecting Y; if X must pursue the less-coercive remedy against en-
forcement in a separate step, so must Y. It also would be incoherent to allow X to
convert her declaratory judgment into an injunction if the government obeyed the
judgment as to X but attempted to enforce the challenged law against Y; non-en-
forcement as to X has given X what he wants, so an injunction prohibiting enforce-
ment as to Y is not "necessary or proper" to protect X. If X cannot protect Y's con-
stitutional rights by bringing a lawsuit to enforce those rights,106 X cannot protect
Ys constitutional rights by converting her declaratory judgment into an injunction
protecting everyone.
In endorsing particularity of federal remedies in Doran, the Supreme Court
treated declaratory and injunctive relief as having the same scope and purpose-
either remedy halts enforcement of the challenged law against the federal plaintiffs,
but leaves the government free to enforce that law against others who violate it. 0 7
Moreover, the milder, less-intrusive, less-strong declaratory-judgment medicine
should not have broader non-party effects than the stronger, more coercive injunc-
tive medicine. If the injunction only prohibits government officials from enforcing
101 Harrison, supra note 6, at 87.
102 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012).
103 Harrison, supra note 6, at 82-83 & n.130.
104 Walsh, supra note 1, at 1725.
1o5 28 U.S.C. § 2202; Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971).
106 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983).
117 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975).
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the challenged law against the parties, the less-coercive declaratory judgment should
only declare that government officials cannot constitutionally enforce the challenged
law against the parties.
In Martin v. Gross, in two consolidated individual actions, the district court
declared invalid a Massachusetts law prohibiting secret recording of government of-
ficials but declined to enjoin enforcement.08 According to the court, the declaratory
judgment meant government officials could not enforce the law against the plain-
tiffs. Enforcement would constitute failure to "do their duty" and would provide a
basis for the court to convert the declaratory judgment into an injunction, the earlier
remedy having failed to persuade the government to change its conduct.109 But the
declaratory judgment properly did not speak to the validity of officials enforcing
that law against non-plaintiffs, and such enforcement would not represent failure to
comply with the judgment or with their official duties. Had Massachusetts officials
continued to enforce those laws against persons who were not party to Martin, those
non-parties would have to join or initiate their own actions and obtain their own
judgments-declaratory, injunctive, or both-protecting them against enforcement
of the recording laws.
B. Article III and Particularized Remedies
Article III's justiciability requirements demand particularity at the front and
back ends of litigation.
1. Standing at the Front End
A plaintiff seeking to bring a pre-enforcement injunctive action must show an
ongoing or impending threat that the challenged law will be enforced against her by
the named defendant. She cannot bring the action based on threats of enforcement
against other persons or against the public as a whole. Whether we describe this as
jurisdictional standing or substantive constitutional merits, the point remains that a
plaintiff must show her own injury and a constitutional violation affecting her re-
sulting from enforcement of the law against her.Ito
Courts undermine this particularity command through what Aaron-Andrew
Bruhl derides as the "one good plaintiff" rule, under which courts adjudicate and
provide broad equitable remedies in multi-party actions so long as one plaintiff can
show standing, without determining standing for every plaintiff.' In doing so,
courts assume that the injunction applies to everyone because a court order stating
108 Martin v. Gross, 380 F. Supp. 3d 169, 172 (D. Mass. 2019).
10 Id
11o See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
"'. Bruhl, supra note 64, at 500; see, e.g., Int'1 Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d
554, 586 (4th Cir. 2017); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 151 (5th Cir. 2015).
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that the defendant cease enforcing the challenged law means it must cease enforcing
it against the universe of potential enforcement targets. Only one person needs
standing to establish the law's constitutional invalidity, with the injunction applying
to all similarly situated persons.112 This error contributes to the move from particu-
larized injunctions to overbroad, universal, non-particularized injunctions.1 13 Bruhl
argues that courts would be more constrained in issuing non-particularized remedies
if they were more constrained about standing. If judges must consider standing (or
substantive constitutional violation) for every plaintiff, they may better consider
how to protect the interests of one plaintiff without going beyond that scope to
protect the universe of similarly situated persons whose rights do not affect the plain-
tiffs rights. 114
2. Mootness at the Back End
Particularity is enforced at the back end through limitations on Article III
mootness. A case is not moot (or mootness will be excepted) when, although the
named plaintiff is not presently harmed or threatened with future harm, the injury
is reasonably likely to reoccur in the future and the claim is so transitory that the
injury would cease of its own force before litigation (including all appeals) could be
completed. " 5 Common applications of the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-re-
view doctrine include constitutional challenges to holiday-season religious displays
(the holiday season lasts approximately one month)1 6 and to laws restricting abor-
tion (pregnancy ends within nine months at most).1 17 Courts adjudicate these cases
despite potential mootness because they otherwise would never have an opportunity
to resolve important constitutional issues arising in these time-sensitive contexts.
For a case to not be moot, the injury must be capable of repetition as to the
plaintiff through a showing that she will be subjected to the challenged unlawful
conduct in the future." 8 For example, the plaintiff must show that she will encoun-
ter the constitutionally invalid religious display in the future or that she might be-
come pregnant and seek an abortion (and be injured by potential enforcement of
the abortion restriction) in the future.
On the other hand, that a non-party might be injured through enforcement of
112 Bruhl, supra note 64, at 487.
" Id. at 511.
" Id. at 541.
115 United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1540 (2018); Turner v. Rogers, 564
U.S. 431, 439-40 (2011); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998).
116 E.g., Chabad-Lubavitch ofVt. v. City of Burlington, 936 F.2d 109, 111 (2d Cir. 1991);
Am. Humanist Ass'n v. Baxter Cty., 143 F. Supp. 3d 816, 822 (W.D. Ark. 2015).
117 Eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).
" Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. at 1540-41; Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17; City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983).
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that abortion restriction or the erection of that religious display does not avoid
mootness. The court's Article III jurisdiction remains bound to actual or threatened
future enforcement against the particular plaintiff, not against the universe of non-
parties who might be subject to future enforcement of the same law raising the same
constitutional issue.l19 For example, imagine X brings an individual action challeng-
ing a seasonal religious display, obtains an injunction prohibiting its erection, and
then moves out of the state. A court would find the case moot once X moves nd no
longer will encounter the display. The government may erect the display the follow-
ing year, even if it causes constitutional injury to Y, a non-parry offended by the
display. Y must establish her standing,120 join or file a new lawsuit challenging the
future display, and obtain a new or extended injunction protecting her from the
constitutionally violative religious display.
Standing and mootness demonstrate the parry-particularized nature of pre-en-
forcement injunctive litigation. The plaintiff must show that she is subject to en-
forcement of the challenged law to go into court and she must show that she is
subject to continued enforcement of the challenged law to continue litigating de-
spite later changes (such as the end of Christmas season). It follows that the remedy
she obtains from the litigation should protect her constitutional rights against en-
forcement, without protecting the constitutional rights of others.
C. Expanding the Scope of the Remedy by Expanding the Scope ofLitigation
Constitutional adjudication could have a broader effect, and there are strong
arguments that it should.121 But to expand the remedial scope beyond the bilateral
one plaintiff/one defendant, courts and litigants must use accepted litigation pro-
cesses, rules, and mechanisms.
From the defendant side, the touchstone is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65(d), which dictates that an injunction can run against a party, her agents, and
"other persons who are in active concert or participation" with a named defend-
ant.122 For example, an injunction running against the state attorney general would
"1 Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. at 1540-41; Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari:
Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges'Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1643, 1734 &n.503
(2000).
120 But cf Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2098 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that offense from a religious display
cannot provide standing).
121 Clopton, supra note 9, at 43-45; Frost, supra note 9, at 1090-101; Malveaux, supra note
9, at 62; Trammell, supra note 9, at 106.
122 FED. R. CIv. P. 65(d)(2)(C).
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run against her deputies as well as against local district attorneys subject to her over-
sight and control.
Plaintiffs can extend the injunction's reach and protection through different
procedural and constitutional rules.
1. Injunctive Class Actions
The obvious expansion vehicle is the civil rights injunctive class action under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). That rule empowers courts to issue class-
wide injunctive relief when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." 23 In pre-
enforcement actions, government officials charged with enforcing the challenged
law oppose the class, their actions in enforcing or threatening to enforce the chal-
lenged law cause injury in a way that applies generally to the class of targets of the
challenged law, and an injunction prohibiting enforcement against the class protects
the class. A class-wide injunction is not a universal/non-particularized injunction.
Rather, the class becomes the plaintiff, assuming an identity and legal status inde-
pendent of the representative individual plaintiff' 24 The class-wide injunction pro-
tects and benefits the plaintiff, but the plaintiff is the entire class. The rule expands
who is a party before the court and therefore who is and may be properly protected
by a particularized/non-universal injunction.125
The Supreme Court enacted the basic framework of Rule 23(b)(2) in 1966 to
empower courts in civil rights actions to issue broad indivisible relief.1 26 The rule
responded to Massive Resistance to Brown in which courts and school districts "rem-
edied" discrimination by ordering an individual African American plaintiff to be
admitted into an all-white school, but without altering the basic segregated structure
or operation of the school system and without benefitting non-party African Amer-
ican students.127 By certifying a class of prospective African American students wish-
ing to attend integrated schools, a court could issue an injunction compelling
broader structural changes benefitting all class members as parties to the case.128
123 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); Bray, supra note 9, at 464 n.278; Morley, DeFacto Class Actions,
supra note 21, at 540; Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 9, at 624 n.49.
124 Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. at 1538; Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975).
125 Sosna, 419 U.S. at 399; Rodgers v. Bryant, 942 F.3d 451, 464 (8th Cit. 2019) (Stras, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Morley, DeFacto Class Actions, supra note 21, at 541;
Morley, Disaggregating, supra note 9, at 17-19.
126 Maureen Carroll, ClassAction Myopia, 65 DuKE L.J. 843, 857-58 (2016).
127 Id. at 858-59; see also David Marcus, Flawed But Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its
Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REv. 657, 680-81 (2011).
128 Carroll, supra note 126, at 859-60; Marcus, supra note 127, at 693-95.
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Allowing non-particularized/universal injunctions in individual cases under-
mines the Court's adopted mechanism for broadening injunctions. If a court can
issue an injunction in an individual action that prohibits enforcement of the chal-
lenged law against all similarly situated persons (e.g., all African American students
desiring to attend the integrated school), Rule 23(b)(2) becomes superfluous. No
plaintiff would bother seeking class certification; her individual lawsuit would be
sufficient to obtain the broader remedy.
Two high-profile examples illustrate the use of the class device.
InJD. v. Azar,129 plaintiffs were detained pregnant unaccompanied immigrant
minors subject to regulations of the Office of Refugee Resettlement hat effectively
barred them from obtaining abortions.130 Courts have been tempted to issue uni-
versal injunctions in cases such as this-a challenge to a broad, federal policy violat-
ing the constitutional rights of many people, plaintiffs and similarly situated persons
affected in the same way. But allowing continued enforcement against non-parties
would not affect individual plaintiffs or limit the "completeness" of their injunctive
relief in an individual action-the ability of X to obtain her desired abortion is not
affected if the regulations prevent Y from obtaining her desired abortion. The dis-
trict court thus followed the procedurally proper path to a broad remedy-it certi-
fied a class of "all pregnant, unaccompanied immigrant minor children (UCs) who
are or will be in the legal custody of the federal government," then issued a particu-
larized injunction prohibiting enforcement of the ORR policy as to the class, which
the court of appeals affirmed as proper.3 1
In Ms. L v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,132 plaintiffs challenged
a federal policy and practice of separating minor children from their asylum-seeking
parents and not taking steps to reunite them, alleging that the practice "shocked the
conscience" in violation of substantive due process.133 The district court certified an
injunctive class of:
[a]H adult parents who enter the United States at or between designated ports
of entry who (1) have been, are, or will be detained in immigration custody
by the [DHS], and (2) have a minor child who is or will be separated from
them by DHS and detained in [Office of Refugee Resettlement ("ORR")]
custody, ORR foster care, or DHS custody absent a determination that the
parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child.'34
129 J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
130 Id. at 1299-300.
131 Id. at 1305-06, 1312.
132 Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enft, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (S.D. Cal. 2018).
133 Id. at 1142-43.
134 Id. at 1139 n.5. The court modified the injunction to reach families whose children had
been released from custody before the injunction was entered. Ms. L v. U.S. Immigration &
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The court then issued a class-wide preliminary injunction, prohibiting federal agen-
cies from detaining parents "without and apart" from their minor children and or-
dering agencies to release any minor children in detention and to reunite children
with their parents.135
While agreeing that Rule 23(b)(2) renders non-particularized injunctions in-
appropriate, Michael Morley identifies a tension between broad classes and limits
on broad injunctions. The real goal of the class may be to bind the government
against the world at large rather than to adjudicate the rights of discrete parties
within the class.136 Morley argues that district courts should never certify nationwide
classes, only district-wide or circuit-wide classes, thereby limiting protection to sim-
ilarly situated persons within a given region.137 This allows for class actions-and
injunctions particularized to those classes-while allowing multiple courts to ad-
dress the constitutional issues.
2. Associational Standing
A second option arises where the constitutional plaintiff is an entity suing on
behalf of its members adversely affected by the challenged law.'3 8
In practice, associational standing creates something akin to a class action with
a "prefabricated" or "premade" class of the members of the plaintiff association.
139
The injunction protecting the association protects the association's members spread
across the country or the world, by virtue of their membership in the protected
plaintiff-organization. An individual member avails herself of the injunction's pro-
tections against future enforcement by showing membership in the protected asso-
ciation. Again, however, this does not create or justify universality. The injunction
remains particularized to the association and its members, carrying the same scope
as the individuals suing on their own behalf.14 0
Associational standing imposes additional requirements, which makes it less of
an obvious end-run around particularity than a non-particularized/universal injunc-
tion in an individual action. Association members must be able to establish individ-
ual standing; the individual interests protected in the action must be "germane" to
the association's purposes; and the claim and injunctive remedy must not require
Customs Enf't, 330 F.R.D. 284, 287 (S.D. Cal. 2019).
135 Ms.L.,310F.Supp.3dat1149-50.
136 Morley, Disaggregating, supra note 9, at 25-26.
13 Id.
138 Id. at 27-29; Morley, DeFacto Class Actions, supra note 21, at 539; see, e.g., Hunt v. Wash.
State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511
(1975).
139 Morley, Disaggregating, supra note 9, at 27.
140 Id. at 27-9; Morley, DeFacto Class Actions, supra note 21, at 539, 544-45.
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individual-member participation or individualized facts.141 Morley insists that any
remedy must be tailored to specific parties represented by the plaintiff association,142
such as formal members of the organization.
3. Third-Party Standing
An individual plaintiff, whether a person or organization, may assert third-
party standing in limited circumstances.143 The person or organization claims an
injury from defendant's conduct and sues to vindicate the constitutional rights of
rights-holders with whom the plaintiff has a business, professional, or other close
relationship and where it is not feasible for the right-holders to sue on their own
behalf.144 Permissible relationships for third-party standing include businesses uing
on behalf of potential customers,145 medical professionals suing on behalf of patients
or potential patients,146 and lawyers and advocates suing on behalf of clients.147
Like associational standing, third-party standing imposes additional require-
ments that prevent the court from universalizing an injunction in an otherwise in-
dividual case. The plaintiff must show that it has standing-that it has suffered an
injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the defendants' conduct and is judicially re-
mediable. The plaintiff also must show that her interests are identical and connected
to those of the third-party rights-holders represented or that substantial obstacles
prevent rights-holders from asserting their own rights or leave them unable or un-
likely to sue.148 And as with associational standing, the injunction should be partic-
ularized to the plaintiff and the specific rights-holders with the necessary close rela-
tionship to the plaintiff.' 4 9
4. Incidental Benefits and Spillover Effects
An injunction's "who" expands in practice when relief accorded to the named
plaintiff in an individual action incidentally benefits non-parties similarly situated,
where the effects of the injunction spill over to protect non-parties.
Maureen Carroll describes this as a "system-wide" remedy that provides relief
as broad as the challenged government policy or practice, meaning as broad as the
"I Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.
142 Morley, Disaggregating, supra note 9, at 27.
13 Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129-30 (2004).
1 Id. at 130; U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720 (1990).
145 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976).
14 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480-81 (1965).
14 Triplett, 494 U.S. at 720; Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3
(1989). But see Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 131-33.
148 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 115-16 (1976).
i4 Wasserman, supra note 4, at 370-71.
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people subject to that policy or practice.5 o Morley argues that such relief turns on
a distinction between divisible and indivisible rights and remedies."' Divisible
rights belong to the plaintiff alone and can be remedied by a particularized injunc-
tion protecting the plaintiff alone.152 Indivisible rights of one person cannot be sep-
arated from the rights of others and a remedy benefitting one person necessarily
benefits other people similarly situated.153 Because the remedy cannot distinguish
parties from non-parties, a class is unnecessary to produce an injunction protecting
or benefitting beyond the individual plaintiff.
Consider several examples. In an action challenging prison conditions, protect-
ing one plaintiff prisoner by ordering government officials to remove raw sewage
from the prison floors benefits all prisoners, since the prison cannot clean sewage as
to one prisoner and not others.154 In a challenge to legislative districting, the remedy
for a constitutionally invalid district is an injunction compelling the government to
redraw the district, a remedy benefitting all voters whose rights were infringed by
the previous, constitutionally infirm district.1 5 5 The government cannot redraw the
district to benefit the plaintiff without benefitting similarly situated voters in the
district. In a challenge to a Christmas tree or Ten Commandments erected in a
public space, the injunction protects the plaintiff from the offense of having to en-
counter the display; the remedy of ordering the government to remove the display
benefits non-parties who also might be offended. The government cannot remove
or cover the display for one person and not for others. Finally, in challenges to Pres-
ident Trump's plans to "reprogram" funds to build a wall on the Mexico border, an
injunction prohibiting impermissible use of those funds protects everyone;1 56 a
court cannot stop some wall spending for the benefit of the plaintiff without stop-
ping all wall spending for the benefit of all.
These cases do not produce non-particularized/universal injunctions protecting
non-parties. They produce particularized injunctions protecting and benefitting
150 Carroll, supra note 126, at 860.
'5' Morley, Disaggregating, supra note 9, at 38; Morley, DeFacto Class Actions, supra note 21,
at 492.
152 Morley, Disaggregating, supra note 9, at 47; Morley, DeFacto Class Actions, supra note 21,
at 524-25.
153 Carroll, supra note 126, at 846; Marcus, supra note 127, at 667; Morley, Disaggregating,
supra note 9, at 47; Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 9, at 616-17; Morley, DeFacto
Class Actions, supra note 21, at 524; Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 9, at 55-56.
'5 Morley, Disaggregating, supra note 9, at 38.
155 Id; Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 9, at 616.
156 Sierra Club v. Trump, No. 19-cv-00892-HSG, 2019 WL 2715422 (N.D. Cal. 2019),
stay denied929 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2019), stay granted 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019); El Paso Cty. v. Trump,
408 F. Supp. 3d 840 (W.D. Tex. 2019).
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only the plaintiffs, enforceable only by the plaintiff, and violated only if the defend-
ant fails to perform as to the plaintiff (that is, by attempting to take the enjoined
conduct against the plaintiff). But the benefits of the injunction inure to non-parties
because the remedy for the plaintiff necessarily and unavoidably gives something to
non-parties.'5 7 The difference may appear semantic, but it is procedurally signifi-
cant. A party protected by an injunction can enforce the injunction through a mo-
tion to enforce and by seeking to hold the government officer in contempt.' That
right to enforce the judgment remains limited to the parties who control the litiga-
tion and does not extend to non-parties enjoying incidental spillover benefits.
Return to the religious-display example. If the government fails to remove the
religious display, only the plaintiff can return to court to enforce the injunction; a
non-party who does not want to encounter that display could not.15 9 That non-
party must take some steps to become a party, whether by joining as an individual
plaintiff and asking for the injunction to be extendedl60 or by filing a new civil
action and obtaining her own injunction or declaratory judgment. She then gains
her own court order and the right to enforce it, greater protection than incidental
spillover benefits from another person's court order.
IV. PRINCIPLE FOUR: JUDGMENTS AND OPINIONS, PRECLUSION
AND PRECEDENT
A court issues two papers when it decides a case-a judgment and an opinion.
Failure to distinguish these papers, their meaning, and their effects explains some of
the confusion over the scope of remedies. Maintaining the distinction is essential to
understanding constitutional litigation.
A. Judgments
The binding judgment resolves constitutional litigation involving one plaintiff,
one defendant, one law, and one constitutional right.161 Will Baude argues that the
root of the judicial power under Article III is the authority to "issue binding judg-
ments and to settle legal disputes within the court's jurisdiction. But judgments set-
de only those legal disputes, not others."
62
17 Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 9, at 55-56.
158 FED. R. Civ. P.70; 28 U.S.C. %§ 401-402 (2012).
159 See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
1" FED. R. CIv. P. 20.
161 Baude, supra note 14, at 1811; Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1327; Thomas W.
Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
43, 44-45 (1993); Pushaw, supra note 80, at 860; see supra Part III.
162 Baude, supra note 14, at 1811.
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A judgment must be obeyed by the parties and enforced by the executive, even
if erroneous.163 A party cannot avoid its obligation to obey a judgment and cannot
avoid contempt on the ground that the judgment is wrong. Under the "collateral
bar rule," a party cannot disobey an injunction and challenge the subsequent con-
tempt finding on the ground that the underlying injunction was erroneous or inva-
lid.' An erroneous judgment can be challenged and corrected through established
judicial processes, such as appellate review of the judgment, subject to the proce-
dural rules and limits that Congress and the courts put in place.165 But the enjoined
party must obey that judgment while appellate review proceeds, unless the injunc-
tion is stayed pending review.166 The completion of appellate review produces an
Article-III-final judgment, which cannot be questioned or undone by the other
branchesl67 and is subject to limited judicial reconsideration.1 6 8 A court may enforce
that order on its own or on request of a party, including by holding non-compliant
parties in contempt of court and ordering them jailed.169
For the reasons discussed in Part III, any judgment remains particularized to
the litigation at issue and to the parties to that litigation.170 Only parties are bound
to abide by the judgment or subject to the court's enforcement powers, such as con-
tempt. And this is true whether the constitutional judgment arises from an enforce-
ment action, a pre-enforcement Ex Parte Young action, or a retroactive damages
action.171
The effect of any judgment is controlled by the law of judgments and the law
of preclusion.172 The final judgment resolves the dispute between parties and can be
enforced to ensure that those parties comply. Preclusion then limits the right to
163 Id. at 1826; Harrison, supra note 6, at 87; Pushaw, supra note 80, at 860; Wasserman,
Departmentalism, supra note 8 (manuscript at 30-3 1). But see Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at
1325.
1" Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 314, 316 (1967).
165 Id. at 314.
'" Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009); Blackman & Wasserman, supra note 18, at
283.
1(7 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (195); Lawson & Moore, supra
note 5, at 1319.
16' See FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cry. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 379-80
(1992).
169 FED. R. CIV. P. 70; 28 U.S.C. %§ 401-402; see Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335-36
(1977); Miller v. Caudill, 936 F.3d 442, 446 (6th Cir. 2019); Reynolds v. Roberts, 207 F.3d
1288, 1297 (11th Cit. 2000).
170 Baude, supra note 14, at 1826; Pushaw, supra note 80, at 860; supra Part III.
71 Supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
172 Fallon, Fact, supra note 11, at 923 n.31; Fallon, As Applied, supra note 11, at 1339;
Harrison, supra note 6, at 88; Steinman, supra note 11, at 1957.
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relitigate, in a new action, the legal and factual issues considered and resolved by
that judgment.173 But like the judgment, preclusion is limited to the parties to the
first action or to those with a close or privity connection with them; preclusion does
not affect those unconnected to the original litigation and the judgment resolving
that litigation.174
Courts have relaxed this rule somewhat, allowing non-mutual preclusion-a
non-party to Case I avails herself of the preclusive effect of the judgment against a
party to Case I, who should not be allowed another bite at the apple in Case 11.175
But under United States v. Mendoza,176 non-parties cannot use preclusion against
the federal government or federal officials,177 a principle that some courts have ex-
tended to state governments and officials.'7 8 That is, a non-party to the judgment
in Court I cannot use non-mutual preclusion against the federal or state govern-
ments (or officials) to resolve new litigation in Court II. If Court II is considering
actual or threatened enforcement against Y, a non-party in Court I, Y cannot argue
that the constitutional question has been resolved against the government by Court
I's judgment as to X and that preclusion binds Court II to reach the same conclu-
sions on the constitutional question.
This point has been the target of recent scholarly criticism. Zachary Clopton
and Alan Trammell independently argue that Mendoza was wrongly decided and
that Congress or courts should overrule or narrow it.1 7 9 This would allow non-par-
ties in Court I to obtain the preclusive benefits of the constitutional ruling to bar or
halt the government from future enforcement against them in Court II. Y could
argue that Court I's judgment in X resolved the question of the law's constitutional
validity against the government after the government had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the constitutional issue. That judgment binds Court II, requiring it to
find the law constitutionally invalid and unenforceable in an action involving Y,
without requiring Y to litigate the constitutional issue and without permitting the
government to relitigate an issue on which it previously lost.
Clopton and Trammell link Mendoza to the scope-of-injunction debate. Both
authors argue that if-in a non-Mendoza world-a non-party can benefit from
'73 Clopton, supra note 9, at 10-13; Trammell, supra note 9, at 71-72; see United States v.
Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984).
7 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159-60; Clopton, supra note 9, at 10-13; Harrison, supra note 6,
at 88.
175 Clopton, supra note 9, at 12-13; Trammell, supra note 9, at 94-95.
176 Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154.
177 Id. at 162.
178 Idaho Potato Comm'n v. G & T Terminal Packaging, Inc., 425 F.3d 708, 713-14 (9th
Cir. 2005); Morley, Nationwide, supra note 9, at 623-24.
179 Clopton, supra note 9, at 37; Trammell, supra note 9, at 97-101.
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Court I's judgment via non-mutual preclusion, then Court I should-in an appro-
priate case-be able to skip the middle step and directly protect non-parties via a
universal/non-particularized injunction.8 0 Either approach gives non-parties the
benefits of Court I's injunction; allowing Court I to make the injunction univer-
sal/non-particularized protects the non-party without the need for additional litiga-
tion in Court II.
The problem with the argument is that the scope of a judgment and the scope
of preclusion need not be coextensive. Expanding the preclusive effect of a judgment
does not require expanding the permissible scope of that judgment. The symmetry
between a judgment in an enforcement action and a judgment in the corresponding
pre-enforcement action demonstrates why.
Suppose Mendoza were overruled. The government initiates an enforcement
action against X, who defends on the ground that the law being enforced is consti-
tutionally invalid; Court I agrees and dismisses the action against X. Without Men-
doza and with non-mutual preclusion available against the government, Y could
assert preclusion based on that judgment in a subsequent enforcement action-Y
could argue that Court II is bound by the judgment of Court I on the constitutional
issue without Y having to litigate the constitutional question and without the gov-
ernment having an opportunity to relitigate the constitutional question on which it
lost before Court I. But the judgment of Court I would not protect anyone other
than X, regardless of how anyone might wield its preclusive effect in subsequent
litigation. Regardless of preclusion rules, the government would violate that judg-
ment, and be subject to contempt, only by attempting to enforce against X, not
against Y or another non-party.
The same should hold if the judgment from Court I came in a pre-enforcement
Ex Parte Young action by X. Broadening the preclusive effect of that judgment need
not broaden the judgment and injunction itself. Regardless of the posture of the
litigation that produced Court I's judgment, the preclusive effect of that judgment
matters for subsequent litigation in which Court II determines the effect to accord
Court I's prior judgment.'8 ' It should not matter for the scope of the prior judgment
itself and Court I's authority, including the power of contempt, to enforce it.
B. Opinions
The opinion, the second paper the court issues, is a reasoned explanation jus-
tifying the judgment. Opinions are "essays written by judges explaining why they
1so Clopton, supra note 9, at 6, 19, 36-38; Trammell, supra note 9, at 101.
'8! Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 307 (2011).
2020] 1107
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
rendered the judgment they did. The primary significance of these essays for non-
judicial actors is the guidance they provide in predicting future judicial behavior."
82
They "explain the grounds for judgments, helping other people to plan and order
their affairs."' 83 This giving of reasons for an outcome represents a hallmark of ju-
dicial decision-making.184
Court I's opinion-its essay-explaining why a law is constitutionally valid or
invalid and justifying the judgment serves as precedent for Court II in considering
the constitutional validity of that law or a similar law in a separate action involving
a different rights-holder. Precedential force varies by court.' 8 5 A district court opin-
ion as to the validity of a law has persuasive force for the next court, including for
judges within that district, but no binding force.186 A regional court of appeals opin-
ion has binding force on other panels of that circuit (and can be reversed only by
that circuit sitting en banc)'8 7 and on district courts within its circuit, but persuasive
force on courts of appeals and trial courts elsewhere. A Supreme Court decision has
binding force on all courts in all circuits and districts and in all state courts. 188
There are debates and confusion about when a judicial decision establishes
precedent, what that precedent is, and how courts can tell.'
8 9 While important ques-
tions, they are beyond the current point that precedent governs a judicial decision's
prospective non-party effects-on government officials and rights-holders forming
182 Merrill, supra note 161, at 62; cf Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV.
L. REv. 457, 457 (1897) ("The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the
incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.").
183 Baude, supra note 14, at 1844; Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1327; Merrill, supra
note 161, at 44-45, 62.
"8 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 387-88
(1978).
"8 Randy Kozel, The Scope ofPrecedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 185-86 (2014).
186 Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S.
605, 617 (1989); Fallon, As Applied, supra note 11, at 1340; Fallon, Fact, supra note 11, at 924
n.3 1. But see Morley, Disaggregating, supra note 9, at 53-54 (proposing that district court opinions
be given intra-district or intra-circuit binding, or stare decisis, effect).
187 Mitchell, supra note 4, at 946-47, 1017.
118 Cass, supra note 9 (manuscript at 44-45); Fallon, Fact, supra note 11, at 923 n.3 1; Fallon,
As Applied, supra note 11, at 1339; Harrison, supra note 6, at 88; Steinman, supra note 11, at
1957.
189 RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSuS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT (2017); Richard
Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent From Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921 (2016); Richard Re,
Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REv. 1861, 1863 (2014); Frederick
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 571 (1987); Steinman, supra note 11, at 1950.
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their primary conduct in the real world and on courts and parties to future litiga-
tion.19 0 The effect of binding precedent (whatever its scope) continues until a deci-
sion is overruled, while persuasive precedent allows different courts to decide issues
in their own ways, depending on how convincing they find prior opinions.
The other significant feature of precedent is that it can change, whether by a
higher court reversing a lower court judgment or by any court revisiting and over-
ruling precedent after some time.11 While government officials and individuals ar-
range their primary conduct around existing precedent,192 all must account for that
possibility in organizing their enforcement activities.193
This leaves individuals and government with freedom and with uncertainty.
Laws that government officials believe are unenforceable under current precedent
remain on the books and may become enforceable with a change in precedent; laws
they believe are enforceable cease to be so with a change in precedent.194 Conduct
that individuals believe they may constitutionally engage in, free from government
restriction, may lose its constitutional protection and become subject to restriction
with a change in precedent.195 Conduct that individuals believe prohibited may be-
come permissible with a change in precedent and recognition of constitutional pro-
tection for their conduct.
C judgments, Opinions, and Non-Particularity
Arguments in favor of non-particularized/universal injunctions grant courts
broader authority to establish the parameters of constitutional law for other persons,
beyond resolving the case at hand.196 But the judgment and injunction need not
perform that function, either directly via an injunction protecting the universe of
the law's targets or indirectly via non-mutual preclusion. Instead, the opinion per-
forms that function. The opinion provides the wider prospective non-party author-
ity of the decision through the law of precedent and stare decisis. And the opinion
protects other rights-holders by establishing the parameters of constitutional law
and constitutional rights for future litigation.
197
'9 Baude, supra note 14, at 1844; Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1327; Merrill, supra
note 161, at 44-45, 62.
191 Walsh, supra note 1, at 1715.
192 Baude, supra note 14, at 1844; Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1327; Merrill, supra
note 161, at 44-45, 62.
193 Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1008.
194 Id. at 987.
195 Id. at 948, 987-88.
196 Frost, supra note 9, at 1087-89, 1092-95; Malveaux, supra note 9, at 62-63.
'19 Baude, supra note 14, at 1844; Fallon, Fact, supra note 11, at 923 n.31; Fallon, As Applied,
supra note 11, at 1339; Merrill, supra note 161, at 44-45; Morley, Disaggregating, supra note 9,
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Judgment and precedent operate differently within the judicial hierarchy. A
district court opinion is not binding precedent, even on other judges within the
district.198 But a district court judgment, unstayed,199 is and remains binding on the
parties, carrying the same force and effect on those parties as an injunction that has
been reviewed and affirmed by a higher court. While in effect, the district court
injunction places enjoined government officials in the same position as where the
injunction was affirmed on review or where officials declined to seek review. That
force remains unless and until the judgment is reversed by a higher court. Allowing
non-particularized/universal injunctions thus expands the power and force of one
district judge's decision, giving its judgment force that its opinion lacks as precedent.
Similarly, Supreme Court affirmance of the district court's judgment does not
expand the injunction. If the district court entered a non-universal/party-particular-
ized injunction, the Supreme Court affirms a non-universal/party-particularized in-
junction; the injunction does not gain broader scope or force to protect beyond the
parties.
Supreme Court affirmance does mean all future enforcement efforts necessarily
fail and all pre-enforcement actions to enjoin enforcement necessarily succeed, be-
cause all courts are bound by the Supreme Court's pronouncement hat the chal-
lenged law is constitutionally defective and not enforceable.200 But the affirmance
resolves the question as a matter of the law of precedent-the binding precedential
effect of the Supreme Court's opinion on any subsequent court deciding a legal issue
arising from a new government threat or attempt to enforce the law against non-
parties to the first case (who are not protected by the judgment). The affirmance is
not a function of the law of judgments or of a non-particularized judgment prohib-
iting enforcement against those non-parties.
Preclusion and precedent both empower the later court. Court II decides the
scope and meaning of the precedent set by Court I's opinion and whether and how
to apply it in resolving the new action before it. Similarly, the preclusive effect of
Court I's judgment "is usually the bailiwick" of Court 11.201 Following a judgment
from Court I, the parties in Court II raise the preclusive effect of that judgment
before Court II; Court II decides whether preclusion applies and the scope of that
preclusion.
at 24-25, 39-40.
198 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
'9 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009); Blackman & Wasserman, supra note 18, at
283.
200 Blackman & Wasserman, supra note 18, at 252-53; Steinman, supra note 11, at 1957;
Walsh, supra note 1, at 1715, 1727-28.
201 Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 307 (2011).
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The trend towards universal/non-particularized injunctions reflects judicial im-
patience with this adjudicative process. Universality/non-particularity seeks to em-
power Court I to seize control of the adjudicative process at the expense of Court
II. And it extends the judgment and the law of judgments to swallow the opinion
and the law of precedent.
Court I, having declared the challenged law constitutionally invalid in Case I
and having extended its judgment beyond the parties, strips Court II of the oppor-
tunity (or at least the need202) to adjudicate the same issue involving different par-
ties. Court I can prevent Court II from deciding either the scope of Court I's judg-
ment and injunction or the meaning of its opinion as precedent. Court I would
issue the lone controlling judgment and opinion on the law's constitutional validity
and prohibit all enforcement of that law against anyone, subject only to reversal by
its regional circuit or by the Supreme Court. Court I can guard both through its
enforcement and contempt powers, cutting off any opportunity for disagreement by
the parties or by another court.
Supporters of universal/non-particularized injunctions reject individual, atom-
ized litigation of constitutional rights, fearing a flood of duplicative litigation in
which each affected individual or entity must file its own action and obtain its own
injunction. 203 For example, in imposing a universal/non-particularized injunction
in an action challenging regulations stripping federal funds from "sanctuary cities,"
the Northern District of Illinois emphasized that 37 counties and cities had filed an
amicus brief in that action.204 Because all had been heard in this case, judicial econ-
omy counseled against compelling each to file a separate lawsuit to have a separate
court resolve legal issues already addressed.20 5
But multiple or successive litigation is not duplicative litigation. Rather, mul-
tiple or successive litigation is necessary to create precedent-persuasive and bind-
ing-that later courts can use to guide resolution of later cases. Multiple precedents
from multiple cases in multiple courts allow "percolation of legal questions" through
different district courts and courts of appeals, allowing each court to reach its own
conclusion, pending final resolution by the Supreme Court.206 Allowing univer-
sal/non-particularized injunctions to preempt further litigation preempts the crea-
tion of new precedent.
Although not a constitutional case, Nevada v. United States Department ofLa-
bor offers a bizarre example of the problems created by this sort of judicial reach.
202 See Wasserman, supra note 8 (manuscript 24-26).
203 Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 4572208, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017);
Frost, supra note 9, at 1101; Malveaux, supra note 9, at 61-62; Trammell, supra note 9, at 82.
204 Chicago, 2017 WL 4572208, at *3.
205 Id.
206 Bray, supra note 9, at 420; Wasserman, supra note 4, at 383.
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Several states and business organizations sued in the Eastern District of Texas, chal-
lenging the validity under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") of Department of
Labor ("DOL") regulations raising the salary line at which employees become ex-
empt from overtime requirements (that is, broadening the class of employees enti-
tled to overtime pay). The district court issued a universal/non-particularized pre-
liminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the regulations,207 then granted
summary judgment for the plaintiffs.20 8
A Chipotle employee named Carmen Alvarez, represented by counsel, filed a
separate action in the District of New Jersey, alleging that the company had denied
her overtime compensation in violation of DOL regulations.209 The Eastern District
of Texas found Alvarez and her lawyers in contempt of its original injunction; all
were in privity with DOL and, because the injunction was universal/non-particu-
larized, their attempts to enforce a regulation that the court had determined was
unenforceable violated a court order to which they were subject.2 10
More than a year later, the Fifth Circuit reversed the contempt finding, reject-
ing the argument that Alvarez or her attorneys were in privity with DOL, given the
absence of evidence of an express or implied legal relationship under which DOL
could be said to represent Alvarez's interests.2 11 The court added, " [mlore generally,
Chipotle's theory that the DOL represents every worker's legal interests through its
enforcement of the FLSA so as to bind every worker in the United States to an
injunction where the DOL is the only bound party lacks authoritative support."212
Federal labor law gave individuals unique legal rights and the opportunity to enforce
those rights in private litigation when violated by a particular actor, distinct from
the power of the federal government to enforce federal labor laws.213
Had the district court's original injunction been properly particularized, prec-
edent could have done the work here, rather than judgment and contempt. Alvarez's
action against Chipotle should have gone forward, with Chipotle urging the District
of New Jersey to agree with the Eastern District of Texas's opinion that the overtime
regulations were invalid and unenforceable as to Alvarez, requiring the former court
to resolve the lawsuit against her and in favor of Chipode.214 Alternatively, because
207 Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Tex. 2016).
208 Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 275 F. Supp. 3d 795 (E.D. Tex. 2017).
209 Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 321 F. Supp. 3d 709, 720 (E.D. Tex. 2018).
210 Id. at 720, 726.
211 Texas v. Dep't of Labor, 929 F.3d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 2019).
212 Id. at 213.
213 Id.
214 To the extent there was privity among DOL and Alvarez and her attorneys, that should
have been left for a preclusion analysis, not judgment and contempt, in the second court. Chipode
could have urged the District of New Jersey to apply non-mutual defensive preclusion based on
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the Eastern District of Texas would not have been binding authority on the District
of New Jersey, the latter court could have reached a different legal conclusion about
the regulations' validity and ruled in favor of Alvarez.21 5 This also would have cre-
ated a division of authority on the legal question, potentially requiring Supreme
Court resolution. Either way, this shows the law of precedent and percolation in
action.
Arguments in favor of universal injunctions-and the broader scope of law that
universal injunctions provide-really amount to arguments about precedent and its
role in future litigation.
Mila Sohoni shows that the Supreme Court has long affirmed injunctions that,
by their terms, prohibit government conduct as a universal and categorical matter,
not limited to the plaintiffs.216 This includes some of the Court's most significant
constitutional cases2 17 in which the Court intended and the public understood the
Court to have stopped all enforcement of the constitutionally infirm laws, not only
enforcement against the plaintiffs.
Sohoni offers as one example West Virginia Board ofEducation v. Barnette2 *in
which the Court held that the First Amendment prohibited states from compelling
public-school children to stand and recite the Pledge of Allegiance.2 1 9 She offers a
hypothetical: The day after Barnette, the federal government compelled students in
D.C. schools to salute the flag, producing a new constitutional challenge to the new
law; she argues that "there is no basis in Article III for thinking that such a hypo-
thetical case would have or should have come out any differently than Barnette
did."2
20
Sohoni is correct that the subsequent court in this hypothetical would have
reached the same result as Barnette. But the reason would have been precedent and
the binding nature of Supreme Court opinions, not the scope of the Barnette in-
junction. The Court having declared in Barnette that compulsory flag salutes violate
the First Amendment, all lower courts must follow that opinion as precedent and
that privity, but leaving to that court to determine the first injunction's preclusive effect. But the
Eastern District of Texas did not want to surrender authority. And the overbroad universal/non-
particularized injunction it issued in Nevada's lawsuit allowed it to control the legal issues in a
subsequent case, even as to non-parties.
215 That would have remained true had the Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal in Nevada. A
court of appeals decision is persuasive, but not binding, on a district court in a different circuit;
the District of New Jersey is not located in the Fifth Circuit.
216 Mila Sohoni, The Lost History ofthe "Universal"Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920, 926-
28 (2020).
217 Id. (manuscript at 5, 70-71); see, e.g., W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
28 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
219 Id. at 642.
220 Sohoni, supra note 216, at 991.
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declare that all similar government attempts to compel the salute violate the First
Amendment. The new dispute would have been litigated in the District of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, with that court resolving new litigation involving new parties
based on binding precedent. In fact, the hypothetical D.C. case would have reached
the same result had the Barnette injunction been expressly particularized/non-uni-
versal. The District of the District of Columbia would have performed the same
analysis-apply the binding precedent of the Barnette opinion and conclude that
D.C.'s attempted compulsion violated the First Amendment.
But this would have had nothing to do with the injunction and judgment in
Barnette itself. The district court in West Virginia, which issued and must oversee
and manage the injunction affirmed in Barnette, would play no role in the new dis-
pute as part of managing its injunction. The judgment and injunction from Barnette
would be irrelevant to any subsequent litigation. The opinion and precedent do the
work.
V. PRINCIPLE FIVE: JUDICIAL DEPARTMENTALISM
American constitutional law features a longstanding debate between judicial
supremacy and departmentalism. The former holds that the judicial (especially the
Supreme Court) constitutional interpretation and understanding controls for all
branches and actors.22 1 The latter holds that the legislative and executive branches
(of all governments) possess equal and co-extensive power to interpret the Consti-
tution and owe no deference to judicial understandings.222 This debate has under-
gone an ideological evolution. While conservative constitutionalists223 and Repub-
lican Attorney General Edwin Meese224 initially promoted departmentalism, liberal
scholars have recently taken up the move to "take the Constitution away from the
courts."225
221 MARTIN H. REDISH, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A
DEMOCRATIC PARADOx 40 (2017); Alexander & Schauer, Defending, supra note 1, at 482;
Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial, supra note 1, at 1369-70.
222 LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 252 (2004); REDISH, supra note 221, at 38; Mark A. Graber,Judicial Supremacy
Revisited: Independent Constitutional Authority in American Constitutional Law and Practice, 58
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1549, 1554 (2017); Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1326; Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J.
217, 220 (1994).
223 See Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1328; Paulsen, supra note 222, at 225-26 & n.19.
224 Edwin Meese III, The Law ofthe Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 983 (1987).
225 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); e.g.,
KRAMER, supra note 222, at 5-6.
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Kevin Walsh proposes a middle ground that is normatively preferable and de-
scriptively reflective of actual judicial and political practice; he labels this middle
ground "judicial departmentalism."226 I have hinted at the same understanding in
past work.227 This Part builds on Walsh's argument, situating it within this model
of constitutional adjudication.
A. Judicial Departmentalism
The model of judicial departmentalism I urge here contains three components
and rests on two distinctions-between judgments and opinions, as discussed in
Part IV, 228 and between courts and other branches of the federal, state, and local
governments.
1. Parties Bound and Must Comply
A government officer who is a party to a case is bound by the judgment in that
case. She must obey the court's dictates, as any private party, and is subject to the
court's enforcement power. She can appeal the judgment to a higher court. But once
that judgment becomes Article-III final when the review process has been exhausted
and the judgment remains in place, the official must comply.229
Tara Leigh Grove argues that this obligation of compliance is more convention
than obligation, a recent development traceable to the Civil Rights era and its dis-
contents.230 In modern times, it is uncommon for federal, state, or local officials to
disobey federal judicial decrees and doing so often triggers criticism from the recal-
citrant official's co-partisans as well as political opponents. As Grove explains, the
"norm likely emerged in large part because of the civil rights movement; subsequent
political actors did not want to be equated with the segregationists who led the mas-'
sive resistance to Brown."231
2. Federal Executive Enforcement of Federal Judgments
The federal executive is charged with enforcing judgments of federal courts-
both judgments to which it is a party (challenges to enforcement of federal laws)
and federal court judgments to which state or local officials are parties (challenges
to enforcement of state or local law). The federal executive must enforce an Article-
226 Walsh, supra note 1, at 1715.
227 Blackman & Wasserman, supra note 18, at 253-54.
228 Supra Part IV.
229 REDISH, supra note 221, at 45-46; Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1319.
230 Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) offudicialIndependence, 71 VAND. L. REV.
465, 468 (2018) [hereinafter Grove, Origins]; Tara Leigh Grove, The Power of "So-Called Judges,"
93 N.Y.U. L. REv. ONLINE 14, 15-16 (2018) [hereinafter Grove, Power]. But see Lawson &
Moore, supra note 5, at 1319.
231 Grove, Origins, supra note 230, at 499.
11152020]
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
Ill-final judgment rendered by a federal court, even if the executive disagrees with
the judgment or with the constitutional analysis underlying the judgment.232 In
practice, this means President Eisenhower was constitutionally obligated to send the
101st Airborne to Little Rock in 1957 to ensure that the state complied with a de-
segregation order.233
Gary Lawson and Christopher Moore offer two reasons for the limited execu-
tive power to ignore judgments, which is "so much taken for granted in our legal
culture."234 Beyond what they call the long historical tradition of executive obedi-
ence to judgments, they point to the "principle of coordinacy" between the
branches:
The federal judiciary is a coordinate department of the national government.
If judgments of the courts are not legally binding on the legislative and exec-
utive departments, it is hard to understand in what sense the judiciary could
be coordinate. If the President is free to disregard court judgments, then the
judiciary is reduced to issuing advisory opinions, which may or may not have
the force of law, depending on the determinations of the executive depart-
ment.235
Hamilton glanced at this problem in Federalist No. 78, calling the judiciary the
"least dangerous" branch possessing neither force nor will and neither sword nor
purse, relying on the executive to enforce its judgments.236 For Lawson and Moore,
the judiciary's ineffectiveness obligates executive enforcement, lest one branch be
allowed to render another impotent.237
3. Precedent Binds Courts, Not Other Branches
Walsh's essential insight is that precedent-the forward-looking, prospective
effects of the court's opinion-controls courts, but not legislative or executive offi-
cials.238 Supreme Court precedent binds all federal and state courts while precedent
from other courts has binding or persuasive effect, depending on the court that is-
sued the precedent and the court considering the precedent.239 Legislative and exec-
utive officials at all levels wield independent authority to interpret the Constitution,
232 Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1319; Walsh, supra note 1, at 1721.
233 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 329, 332-34, 419 (2004); Grove, Origins, supra note 230,
at 498; Walsh, supra note 1, at 1744.
234 Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1319. But see Grove, Origins, supra note 230, at 470;
Grove, Power, supra note 230, at 18.
235 Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1320.
236 The Federalist No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
237 Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1320-21.
238 Walsh, supra note 1, at 1728.
239 See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
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consistent with their oaths to support and defend the Constitution.240 They are
never bound by judicial precedent, even precedent from the Supreme Court.241
The judgment/opinion distinction is essential to this element. Unlike the judg-
ment to which parties are bound, the opinion has no independent legal force.242
The opinion is an essay, describing the judicial understanding of the Constitution
and of the validity of the law at issue so as to justify the judgment, while providing
a prediction of what the court might do in a future case.24 3 But it is not law, so it
need not dictate the legislative or executive understanding of the Constitution.
B. Effects offudicial Departmentalism
Judicial departmentalism and its three principles carry several implications.
1. Inconsistent Action
Governments and government officials cannot disregard or take action incon-
sistent with a judgment and injunction arising from a specific dispute to which they
are parties, but only with respect to other parties to that case who are protected by
the judgment and injunction (of whatever appropriate breadth). But governments
and government officials may act inconsistent with the judicial precedent estab-
lished by the explanatory essay in that case (i.e., the opinion) or with the constitu-
tional conclusions reflected in that judgment. The precedential effect of the judicial
opinion, separate from the effect of the judgment, is never more than persuasive on
non-judicial actors.244 Non-judicial officials retain the power to interpret the Con-
stitution themselves and to act on that distinct constitutional interpretation by en-
forcing the law against those who they believe to have violated it, 24 5 so long as those
targets are not protected by a prior judgment and injunction.
This is the accepted understanding when the Court has recognized that some
government action is constitutionally valid but other branches decline to engage in
that conduct based on an independent view that such conduct is not constitutionally
valid. The paradigm is President Jackson and the Second Bank of the United States.
Despite the Court's determination that Congress possessed Article I power to create
the Bank,246 Jackson continued to believe it constitutionally invalid and vetoed the
240 Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1328; Merrill, supra note 161, at 48; Walsh, supra
note 1, at 1721.
241 Baude, supra note 14, at 1841, 1845; Merrill, supra note 161, at 48; Walsh, supra note
1, at 1728.
242 Baude, supra note 14, at 1844-45; Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1328.
243 Merrill, supra note 161, at 62; Mitchell, supra note 4, at 967.
244 Merrill, supra note 161, at 62; Walsh, supra note 1, at 1728, 1737.
245 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975).
24 McCfloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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bill based on his constitutional understanding.2
47
But the distinction between executive obedience to particularized judgments
and executive independence from judicial opinion and precedent allows the con-
verse. Executive officials may exercise powers and engage in conduct that they inde-
pendently conclude to be constitutionally valid in the face of judicial precedent de-
claring the conduct invalid. Conduct as to non-parties does not violate the
particularized judgment or injunction, and precedent does not control other
branches. The combination leaves officials free to act on an independent constitu-
tional understanding as to anyone other than those protected by a judgment.
President Lincoln advocated this position with respect to Dred Scott and the
Missouri Compromise. In his First Inaugural, Lincoln said:
I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional ques-
tions are to be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such deci-
sions must be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit as to the object of
that suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in
all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government. . . . At the same
time, the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government
upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by
decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litiga-
tion between parties in personal actions the people will have ceased to be their
own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into
the hands of that eminent tribunal.
248
Under Lincoln's view, he could continue to enforce the Missouri Compromise
(which prohibited slavery in states and territories north of 36'30 north latitude) even
if he must enforce the judgment declaring that Dred Scott was not free.
2 49 More
generally, judicial departmentalism establishes that political-branch officials can en-
act and enforce a law whenever they believe the law is constitutionally valid, regard-
less of judicial precedent and what a court might have said previously. The executive
can continue to enforce a law with respect to non-parties to Case I (who are not
247 Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 ACOMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 582 (James D. Richardson ed. 1897); ERIC
LOMAZOFF, RECONSTRUCTING THE NATIONAL BANK CONTROVERSY: POLITICS AND LAW IN THE
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 140 (2018); William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 9, 27-28 (2019); Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally
Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 20 (2000); Paul E. McGreal, Ambition's
Playground, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1117 (2000); Paulsen, supra note 222, at 258-59; David
S. Schwartz, Defying McCulloch?Jackson's Bank Veto Reconsidered, 71 ARK. L. REV. 129, 136-38
(2019).
248 First Inaugural Address ofAbraham Lincoln, YALE L. SCH.: AVALON PROJECT (Mar. 4,
1861), https://avalon.law.yale.edul19th-centuryllincoln1.asp.




protected by a judgment) despite a judicial opinion in Case I declaring law or action
constitutionally invalid. A legislature can enact or reenact the same or similar laws,
despite a judicial opinion declaring their constitutional invalidity.
The prospect of inconsistent executive or legislative action enables the change-
ability of precedent. A court can overrule precedent only in deciding a future case;
a court can decide a future case only if that future case can be brought. A legislature
must be willing to enact laws and an executive must be willing to enforce or threaten
to enforce those laws. They might not survive judicial constitutional scrutiny under
existing precedent, but new litigation is necessary to give the courts an opportunity
to change precedent.
The political branches do not do this as a matter of course, tending to accept
the judicial settlement of constitutional questions. But this is not a matter of con-
stitutional obligation. It is a matter of "constitutional norms--of normative con-
straints on elected officials over and above strictly legal limits that oblige them to
participate in the political process with some self-restraint, and so to refrain from
pushing their legal powers to their respective maxima."250 Political actors do not
want to be equated with the segregationists who attempted to disregard school-de-
segregation precedents.251 The norm also furthers the settlement function of law; by
allowing a single judicial determination to control, all actors can organize their pri-
mary conduct going forward.252
The norm should not be confused with a constitutional duty of executive or
legislative compliance with precedent.253 It imposes a degree of prudence. Perhaps
political officials will limit themselves to cases in which they have good reason to
believe the court is ready and willing to overrule the challenged precedent.254 But
officials violate no constitutional rule by moving forward on the argument that pre-
sent judicial doctrine is dead or vulnerable.255 This explains, and justifies, states en-
acting broad restrictions on abortion in 2019. These laws would not be enforceable
under existing Supreme Court precedent, but the enacting legislatures believed they
would survive constitutional scrutiny before a Supreme Court with a new majority
ready to overrule its foundational abortion precedents.256
250 Neil S. Siegel, Law Is Not Enough, 45 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 197, 204 (2019); accord
Merrill, supra note 161, at 44; Walsh, supra note 1, at 1719-20.
251 Grove, Origins, supra note 230, at 498-99.
252 Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicia4 supra note 1, at 1371-72; Alexander & Schauer,
Defending, supra note 1, at 457; Walsh, supra note 1, at 1719-20.
253 Baude, supra note 14, at 1845; Merrill, supra note 161, at 44.
254 Trammell, supra note 9, at 105.
255 Walsh, supra note 1, at 1728.
256 Tavernise, supra note 19; see, e.g., Robinson v. Marshall, No. 2:19cv365-MHT, 2019
WL 5556198 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 29, 2019) (declaring invalid Alabama law imposing criminal
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Importantly, there is no obvious political valence to this independent interpre-
tive authority. The public fears state officials denying marriage licenses to same-sex
couples257 and state legislatures banning all abortions.258 But Mitchell offers as a
competing ideological example the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights
Act.259 The Act required certain "covered" jurisdictions (largely in the South) to
preclear changes to their voting laws with the Department of Justice and allowed
the federal government to obtain an injunction prohibiting a non-precleared change
in state law from taking effect.260 In Shelby County, in an action brought by one
covered county, the Court declared invalid the formula for deciding which jurisdic-
tions are subject to preclearance as violating a principle of equal state sovereignty.261
Nevertheless, a willing federal executive could have continued to attempt to enforce
preclearance by seeking to enjoin other covered jurisdictions-any jurisdiction other
than Shelby County-from enforcing uncleared new voting laws in the hope that
the Court might overrule Shelby County.262
Allowing the executive to ignore precedent that otherwise binds courts recalls
1980s debates over administrative nonacquiescence in which administrative agen-
cies claimed that they were not bound by an appellate court's understanding of a
statute in a case involving different parties, either in a different circuit or, more
controversially, within the same circuit.263 Although that debate focused on admin-
istrative agencies and administrative review of alleged statutory violation, the logic
of nonacquiescence applies to governmental litigation choices in all types of cases.264
Some deride executive disregard for judicially binding precedent as "lawlessness. "265
Others argue that the executive can do this only where it has a "justifiable basis" for
believing that its position, although contrary to current judicial precedent, may be
adopted, and only so long as the executive advocates that position by pursuing liti-
gation and allowing courts to adhere to their existing precedential position.266
penalties on abortion providers).
257 See Miller v. Davis, 267 F. Supp. 3d 961, 972-76 (E.D. Ky. 2017); Trammell, supra
note 9, at 111-12.
258 Supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
259 Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012); Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1006-07.
21 Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 537 (2013); Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1006-
07.
261 Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 556-57.
262 Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1007-08.
263 Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 687 (1989); Merrill, supra note 161, at 48-50; Trammell, supra note
9, at 101-04.
264 Trammell, supra note 9, at 105-06.
265 Id. at 103.
266 Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 263, at 745-55; Trammell, supra note 9, at 105-06.
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Judicial departmentalism and the judgment/opinion distinction imposes an
outer limit on the executive's power to act inconsistent with the judicial understand-
ing. The result is a give-and-take between the judiciary and the other branches across
multiple cases. The judiciary decides Case I, rendering a judgment binding on the
executive as to the parties and an opinion setting judicial constitutional precedent
for future cases. The defendants must comply with that judgment and the federal
executive must enforce it.2 6 7 As to the opinion, relevant executive and legislative
officials have three options: they may agree with that precedent and follow it in the
future; they may disagree with that precedent and act on their independent consti-
tutional understanding and retain, reenact, and enforce the questioned law as to
others; or they may disagree with precedent but decide to follow it for other reasons
(primarily a belief that the court will not overrule precedent).
The second option triggers new litigation in Case II in which the original prec-
edent performs its role in the courts. Case II produces a new judgment and new
precedent-whether overruling or reaffirming the opinion and judicial understand-
ing established in Case I. The executive is bound by the new judgment as to the
parties to Case II and the President must enforce that judgment. As for the prece-
dential effect of the opinion on those who were not party to Case II, the cycle begins
anew.
2. Departmentalism and Particularized Injunctions
Under this model, injunctions must be particularized and non-universal. Only
non-particularized judgments leave the political branches free to engage judicial de-
partmentalism and enforce a law against non-parties to the injunction.268
Universal/non-particularized injunctions conflate judgment and precedent,
converting the subsequent effects of precedent into the primary effects of a judg-
ment. Rather than the judgment controlling present parties and precedent (and in-
dependent executive judgment) controlling future non-parties, a non-particularized
injunction purports to control future behavior of non-parties through the judgment.
But that injunction leaves the executive no room for independent constitutional
judgment in conflict with the underlying opinion. A court through a universal in-
junction can short-circuit the executive's power to reach and act on a different con-
stitutional understanding by converting the forward-looking opinion that does not
bind non-judicial actors into an all-encompassing judgment that does. That, in turn,
short-circuits the executive opportunity to challenge and change precedent.269
This inter-branch give-and-take is analogous to the process of percolation in
267 REDISH, supra note 221, at 45; Baude, supra note 14, at 1809-10.
268 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424-25 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring);
LAYCOCK, supra note 9, at 226.
269 Merrill, supra note 161, at 76.
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which multiple lower courts consider and decide constitutional issues in separate
litigation, which leads to a conversation among those courts. Universal/non-partic-
ularized injunctions allow one court to issue (or affirm) a universal injunction, ob-
viating the force of competing (and possibly contradictory) judgments of coordinate
courts at the same level of the judicial hierarchy.270 Rather than allowing multiple
judges to consider issues independently and reach their best judgments, universality
allows the first court to rule to control the question. The second court has two op-
tions: issue a conflicting injunction that imposes conflicting obligations on the gov-
ernment271 or issue an unnecessary judgment, because the rights of the plaintiff in
Case II are protected by the universal/non-particularized judgment in Case I.272
A universal/non-particularized injunction seizes constitutional interpretive
power from non-judicial actors. The broad injunction compels the executive and
legislature to adhere to the judicial understanding instantiated in a judgment pro-
tecting all potential enforcement targets. It leaves the other branches no room to act
on a competing constitutional understanding, because acting on that contrary in-
terpretation as to non-parties violates not precedent that the executive may disre-
gard, but an injunction and judgment that it may not disregard. It also limits the
executive's opportunity to challenge precedent and to seek to have it overruled by




Judicial departmentalism makes it more difficult for the government to moot
a case in light of judicial precedent. If Court I declares a law constitutionally invalid,
a challenge to the validity of the same or similar law before Court II should not
become moot. Because the executive can reach and follow a different constitutional
understanding than that of Court I (even if Court I is the Supreme Court), a credible
threat remains that the executive may enforce the law against people who were not
parties to (and not protected by the judgment in) the action before Court I.
That the executive might follow judicial precedent should not change that
threat. A case does not become moot because of voluntary cessation of the unlawful
activity by the government defendant.274 Otherwise, a government official could
270 Bray, supra note 9, at 461-62; Wasserman, supra note 4, at 378; supra Part IV.C.
271 Bray, supra note 9, at 462-64; Wasserman, supra note 4, at 383-84.
272 California v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 941 F.3d 410, 432 (9th Cir. 2019)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting); Wasserman, supra note 8 (manuscript 24-27).
273 Cass, supra note 9 (manuscript at 51). The alternative is to move to modify or dissolve
the injunction and use that motion as the vehicle for changing precedent, an unusual and arguably
improper procedure. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 217-18 (1997). But see id. at 257 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
274 Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013).
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engage in unlawful conduct, stop when sued in order to moot the case, then resume
the unlawful conduct.275 Voluntary cessation moots a case only when the defendant
shows it is "absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be
expected to recur."276 An executive promise not to enforce a law on the books gen-
erally does not moot a case because the executive can change her mind at any time,
while repeal of the underlying law will moot the case by rendering enforcement
impossible.277
Judicial departmentalism offers a different justification for this distinction. De-
partmentalism vests the executive with broad constitutional freedom to disagree
with judicial precedent and discretion to make enforcement decisions based on that
disagreement. A promise to adhere to judicial precedent is as unreliable as a promise
not to enforce an existing law and thus should carry no more mooting force; as to
both, the executive can decide at any time to change course and not follow precedent
or adopt a new constitutional understanding. Only legislative repeal of the law to
be enforced-its removal from the books-guarantees that the executive cannot and
will not enforce it.
The marriage-equality litigation campaign provides an example. Obergefell v.
Hodges declared same-sex-marriage bans invalid, establishing binding judicial prec-
edent on the Fourteenth Amendment question in a case arising from bans in Mich-
igan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee.278 At the time of the Obergefell decision,
challenges to bans in other states were pending, including Eighth Circuit appeals of
preliminary injunctions prohibiting enforcement of bans in South Dakota and Ne-
braska.279 Both states moved to dismiss the appeals as moot, based on a promise to
adhere to Obergefel and to not enforce their state marriage bans. The Eighth Circuit
declined to find the cases moot, emphasizing that the challenged laws remained on
the books and that the state's enforcement decision could change.2 80 That judicial
precedent is no more than persuasive on non-judicial actors (such as those who issue
marriage licenses) reinforces the Eighth Circuit's conclusion, by reinforcing the dis-
cretionary nature of executive adherence to precedent.
275 Id.
276 Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 190 (2000)).
277 See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Concord Cmty. Sch., 885 F.3d 1038,
1051 (7th Cir. 2018).
278 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015); Blackman & Wasserman, supra
note 18, at 254-55.
279 Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, 799 F.3d 918, 921-22 (8th Cir. 2015); Waters v. Ricketts,
798 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2015).
280 Rosenbrahn, 799 F.3d at 921-22; Waters, 798 F.3d at 685-86.
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C Judicial Departmentalism to Judicial Supremacy
Larry Alexander and Larry Solum criticize judicial departmentalism because
judicial constitutional interpretation prevails over the legislative or executive inter-
pretation when the dispute reaches the courts; the courts must apply binding prec-
edent, meaning they will decide the case against the government.2 81 If the judicial
view inevitably prevails to produce what looks like judicial supremacy, then judicial
supremacy must be a normatively better and more efficient approach. Walsh labels
this the "collapse" thesis-judicial departmentalism collapses into judicial suprem-
acy after time-consuming and expensive litigation.282
Alexander and Solum argue that "it is child's play to get almost all constitu-
tional questions about which there is interbranch disagreement into the form of a
lawsuit fit for judicial resolution. "283 This reflects Alexis de Tocqueville's long-ago
assertion that there "is hardly a political question in the United States which does
not sooner or later turn into a judicial one."284 Tocqueville laments that "[a]n Amer-
ican judge, armed with the right to declare laws unconstitutional, is constantly in-
tervening in political affairs,"285 such that "few laws can long escape the searching
analysis of the judges, for there are very few that do not injure some private interest
and which advocates cannot or should not question before the courts."286 Where
individual rights are concerned, most disputes over the constitutional validity of a
law can and will make their way into court, where the judicial interpretation of the
Constitution (established via precedent) will prevail over the legislative or executive
interpretation unless and until the Supreme Court (or any highest court) changes
precedent to align with the executive's understanding.
Walsh agrees that rhetoric and practice create a regime of effective judicial su-
premacy because neither the legislature nor executive regularly follows its own con-
stitutional interpretations in the face of competing judicial precedent.287 Collapse is
especially acute when the Supreme Court affirms a particularized injunction, giving
it the same practical effect as a universal/non-particularized injunction. Again, how-
ever, the judgment does not do the work here; precedent and the executive's consti-
tutional judgment as to how to engage and agree with that precedent do the work.
281 Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1594, 1614-15 (2005).
282 Walsh, supra note 1, at 1721-22.
283 Alexander & Solum, supra note 281, at 1614.
284 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., 1969) (1835). But see Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions; Tocqueville's
Thesis Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485, 486 (2004).
285 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 284, at 269.
286 Id. at 102.
287 Walsh, supra note 1, at 1739-40.
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Regardless of practice, the formal legal rules reflect judicial departmentalism.288
Courts must understand the prevailing practice of the political branches and officials
as a matter ofvoluntary compliance, a choice to accede to the judicial interpretation,
rather than a formal system of judicial supremacy.
Several considerations make voluntary compliance with judicial precedent
more likely.
1. Inevitability ofDefeat
The obvious explanation for executive voluntary compliance is the inevitability
of judicial loss in any new enforcement effort. Binding precedent, especially from
the Supreme Court, leaves no room for successful future litigation against non-par-
ties, as courts must adhere to that precedent and rule against the government and in
favor of the rights-holder. And the executive knows that he cannot successfully en-
force the targeted law because precedent will go against him in court. The executive's
only move is not to buck the judicial understanding and thus not to attempt or
threaten new enforcement.
Political officials lack incentive to act contrary to obvious judicial precedent by
enacting or enforcing laws that judicial precedent establishes as constitutionally in-
valid, knowing they will lose once they enter litigation in a court that must follow
precedent. The inevitability of defeat enables the settlement function of law; the
executive accepts that the law is settled by the judicial understanding and follows
that understanding, enabling other actors to plan their primary conduct.289
This recalls Oliver Wendell Holmes's insistence that law is the prediction by
real-world actors, here government officials, of what courts will do.290 Mitchell de-
scribes precedent as a judicial "promise" to protect a rights-holder from a legal ob-
ligation imposed by a law (that remains in place because the challenged law remains
on the books) by denying judicial relief to the government that seeks to enforce that
law.291 To use Mitchell's example of Shelby County and the Voting Rights Act:
Shelby County is a "promise that the Supreme Court will protect covered jurisdic-
tions who disregard the statutory preclearance requirement, by denying judicial re-
lief to those who seek to enjoin the enforcement of a non-precleared law." 29 2 Or to
use the example of marriage equality: Obergefell is a promise that the Court will
protect same-sex couples who are denied marriage licenses by providing a remedy
288 Id. at 1730.
289 Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial, supra note 1, at 1377; Alexander & Schauer,
Defending, supra note 1, at 455.
291 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897);
Merrill, supra note 161, at 44, 62; Mitchell, supra note 4, at 967.
291 Merrill, supra note 161, at 44, 69; Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1008.
292 Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1008.
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(primarily an injunction) against government officials who deny them those li-
censes.293
Alexander and Solum advocate for judicial supremacy because it leaves law and
practice in the same place-the judicial view prevails. But defeat is inevitable only
so long as judicial precedent remains stable. Rhetoric aside, the "Supreme Court
regularly overrules, disregards, or narrows and distinguishes precedents that it no
longer supports, and the judiciary's interpretation of the Constitution has changed
radically over the past 100 years."294 The political branches may continue to enact
and enforce or threaten to enforce laws, hoping to persuade the court to overrule
precedent and allow enforcement.
2. Consequences of Defeat
The risk of defeat in court may not deter determined political officials from
pursuing a distinct constitutional agenda that diverges from judicial precedent. Po-
litical officials do not want to lose in court and do not want to be seen as recalcitrant
actors reminiscent of Southern segregationists, which could have political or elec-
toral consequences. On the other hand, the need for new litigation to convince
courts to overrule precedent requires executive and legislative officials to push in the
face of contrary precedent, hoping to find the case that will convince the judiciary
to change its prevailing understanding of the law. Political officials may be willing
to take repeated chances in court, especially if it allows them to score political points
by criticizing unaccountable runaway 'activist judges"295 who thwart the public will
by enjoining executive enforcement efforts.
Rather than relying on inevitable defeat, judicial doctrine imposes conse-
quences on executive officials for ignoring precedent, pursuing litigation, and losing
in court. They then take their chances. If right about the readiness of the Court to
overrule precedent, they win in court and get the desired legal change. If wrong,
they face genuine litigation consequences. This is how the system, and the interplay
among co-equal branches with co-equal interpretive authority, should function.
a. Qualified Immunity
The target of a law that precedent had established constitutionally invalid may
pursue two forms of judicial recourse. She could bring an Ex Parte Young action to
enjoin threatened or attempted enforcement, or she could bring an action for dam-
ages for the injury caused by past enforcement against state and local officials under
Section 1983 or a Bivens claim against federal officials.296 For example, when the
clerk of Rowan County, Kentucky refused to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
293 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
294 Mitchell, supra note 4, at 946-47 (citation omitted).
295 Grove, Power, supra note 230, at 19.
296 Supra notes 35-41, 56-62 and accompanying text.
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couples despite Supreme Court precedent in Obergefell, couples denied licenses sued
both for an injunction compelling issuance of the licenses and to recover damages
(likely nominal) for the injuries suffered from the delay or denial of their licenses.297
The hurdle to the latter strategy is the executive's defense of qualified immun-
ity. An executive officer is immune from suit for damages so long as his conduct did
not violate a clearly established constitutional right such that no reasonable officer
could have believed his conduct was lawful. Qualified immunity limits damages li-
ability to "plainly incompetent" officers and those who knowingly violate constitu-
tional rights.298 A right is "clearly established" when binding judicial precedent from
the Supreme Court, perhaps binding judicial precedent within a regional circuit, or
a strong consensus of lower-court precedent affirm that right.299 Precedent need not
arise from cases involving substantially similar facts, but there must be sufficient
factual similarity or connection such that the contours of the right were obvious in
light of precedent.300 A right also may be so obvious that it can be clearly established
on general principle without factually similar precedent,30 1 but the bar for obvious-
ness is high.302
This focus on judicial precedent as the fulcrum for qualified immunity both
expands and contracts the interpretive power of non-judicial actors. Because prece-
dent must be factually similar or sufficiently one-sided as to reflect a broad consensus
of lower courts, the doctrine leaves room for departmentalist interpretation, as ex-
ecutive officers can proceed on interpretations departing from precedent so long as
that precedent is not overwhelming or factually identical. It leaves room for execu-
tive discretion, including discretion as to constitutional meaning. On the other
hand, independent executive constitutional interpretations will not save officials
from damages liability when those interpretations conflict with a sufficiently bind-
ing or strong consensus of judicial precedent, especially from the Supreme Court.
Officers lose immunity when they knowingly violate the Constitution as interpreted
by the courts, even though the official acts consistent with his independent inter-
pretation of the Constitution.
297 Ermold v. Davis, 936 F.3d 429, 432-33, 437 (6th Cir. 2019); Blackman & Wasserman,
supra note 18, at 272.
298 White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308
(2015).
299 Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779-80 (2014); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,
741-42 (2011).
300 Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.
301' Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
302 White, 137 S. Ct. at 552; Shafer v. Cry. of Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1117-18 &
n.3 (9th Cir. 2017).
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b. Attorneys'fees
A second consequence of defeat is the availability of attorneys' fees for prevail-
ing plaintiffs in constitutional actions. If the targets of later enforcement succeed in
their subsequent injunctive or damages litigation, executive officials may be liable
not only for the primary remedy but also for the rights-holder's attorneys' fees.
Prevailing § 1983 plaintiffs are entitled to fees from state and local officials and
governments under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Enacted in 1986, it vests the court with
discretion whether to award, but allows denial of fees only in extraordinary circum-
stances.303 Plaintiffs who prevail in enjoining enforcement of federal law may re-
cover fees through the Equal Access to Justice Act, which provides for an award of
fees and costs, "unless the court finds that the position of the United States was
substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust."
304 Pre-
vailing Bivens plaintiffs cannot recover fees from individual federal officials.
305 A
party prevails when she obtains a judicial order and remedy that materially alters the
relationship between plaintiff and defendant in an "enduring" way, including
awards of compensatory damages, nominal damages, preliminary or permanent in-
junctive relief, consent decrees, and declaratory judgments.
306
Attorneys' fees incentivize individuals to pursue litigation to vindicate their
rights and to hold government officials accountable for misconduct by incentivizing
competent counsel to pursue these claims, regardless of the client's resources or the
monetary value of the legal claim. Fees also offer an additional remedy for plaintiffs
and an additional deterrent against government misconduct, where the attorneys'
fees may represent the only money government officials will pay.
For our purposes, attorneys' fees also deter departmentalism and executive non-
compliance with precedent. The executive who acts contrary to precedent knows
that once the case enters litigation, the judicial understanding will prevail and the
government will lose, unless the executive succeeds in convincing the court to over-
rule precedent. Losing now costs the government not only the primary remedy, but
also attorneys' fees. And those fees may prove substantial-Rowan County, Ken-
tucky paid more than $220,000 for County Clerk Kim Davis's refusal to follow
Obergefell and issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and the litigation that
followed.307 Faced with the prospect of new litigation producing a judicial loss and
"1 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
304 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2012).
305 Kreines v. United States, 33 F.3d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 1994); Alexander A. Reinert,
Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477, 494 (2011).
306 Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 82-83, 86 (2007); Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 3-4
(1988) (per curiam).
307 Miller v. Caudill, 936 F.3d 442, 452-53 (6th Cir. 2019). States collectively paid more
than $13.5 million in fees in defending same-sex marriage bans in the lead-up to Obergefell. See
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a steep fees bill if she continues on her departmentalist path, the executive may elect
to follow precedent rather than incur the cost and political fallout of these efforts.308
c. Attorney Obligations
When a dispute over continued enforcement reaches litigation, executive-
branch attorneys must defend the challenged law and the executive's decision to
continue enforcing. Although not binding on the executive, judicial precedent limits
the arguments that attorneys can pursue before a court that is bound by judicial
precedent.
One limitation is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. That rule prohibits par-
ties from pursuing legal claims and defenses that are not "warranted by existing law
or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law
or for establishing new law."309 The applicable "law" to which Rule 11(b) (2) refers
includes judicial precedent, such that an argument is frivolous if it has "absolutely
no chance of success under the existing precedent."310 Regardless of the executive's
view of the Constitution and of the validity of the challenged law, government at-
torneys run afoul of Rule 11, subjecting themselves to sanctions, if they defend the
law purely with regard to the executive interpretation and ignore (and ask the court
to ignore) prevailing judicial understanding as reflected in binding and persuasive
precedent. Rule 11 leaves attorneys some room to urge courts to reverse or modify
existing law and to reject the prevailing judicial understanding in favor of the pre-
vailing executive view. But the argument must be "nonfrivolous"; government at-
torneys must have good reason and support, beyond another branch's competing
constitutional vision, to argue for new law and for believing the courts are willing
to adopt a new legal theory.3 11
This limitation is echoed in Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct: "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an
issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous,
which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law."3 12 This seems to prohibit government attorneys from defending the
validity of enforcing a law in the face of unfavorable precedent unless they argue for
reversing that law. Commentary establishes that defense of a law or its enforcement
Anthony Michael Kreis, Stages of Constitutional Grief Democratic Constitutionalism and the
Marriage Revolution, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 871, 895 (2018).
308 Blackman & Wasserman, supra note 18, at 261.
301 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).
310 In re Sargent, 136 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Brubaker v. City of
Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1373 (4th Cir. 1991)).
311 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment; Estreicher & Revesz,
supra note 263, at 755.
312 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2019).
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is not frivolous because the attorney believes it will fail so long as there is a good-
faith argument.3 13 ModelRule 3.3(a)(2) requires that lawyers "disclose to the tribu-
nal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly
adverse to the position of the client,"314 meaning government counsel must disclose
to the court that the executive's enforcement efforts run contrary to controlling
precedent.
A third limitation is institutional. The Department of Justice ("DOJ") repre-
sents the executive in court, and DOJ attorneys may be reluctant to vigorously de-
fend an executive constitutional position that contradicts judicial precedent. One
reason is self-preservation; as Thomas Merrill argues, government "lawyers, berated
at oral argument and chastised in strident opinions for the [government's] behavior,
will quickly lose the stomach to persist in enforcing the [executive] interpretation.
Eventually, the [executive] will cave in and accept the judicial understanding."3 1 5
Lawyers must exercise "independent professional judgment,"316 not merely parrot
the elected officials' contrary legal views that are unlikely to prevail in court. And
they want to avoid the appearance that the executive is not merely permissibly as-
serting departmental power contrary to judicial precedent, but impermissibly defy-
ing or circumventing a court order in the current case, and doing so with the attor-
ney s assistance.
The power balance within the executive branch provides another institutional
limit. Executive-branch attorneys view judicial precedent as stating rules of law.3 17
And there is a benefit to that respect for precedent. Neil Devins and Saikrishna
Prakash argue that political appointees and career attorneys in the DOJ:
enhance their Department's autonomy and their status by embracing the
duties to defend and enforce and other widely shared norms and tradi-
tions, customs that aid them in turf wars with the White House and other
departments. At the same time, the duty is malleable, with vague excep-
tions that allow Justice Department officials to further both their own le-
gal policy preferences and the desires of the White House and Congress.
3 18
The DOJ can prevail in turf wars with the White House and other executive de-
partments by pointing to the difficulty of defending prospective enforcement of a
law in the face of controlling judicial precedent. DOJ may urge the executive to
313 Id. r. 3.1 cmrt. 2.
31 Id. r. 3.3(a)(2).
315 Merrill, supra note 161, at 73.
316 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 2.1.
317 Merrill, supra note 161, at 69.




push the non-judicial position only in cases in which it believes the court might
overrule precedent and adopt the executive position. And it can ensure that the ex-
ecutive pursues litigation, appeals adverse decisions, and follows other efforts to in-
stantiate that position.319
The Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") further instantiates DOJ respect for ju-
dicial precedent and thus judicial supremacy. OLC opinions on constitutional ques-
tions bind the executive branch, subject to overruling by the President or the Attor-
ney General.320 OLC is unlikely to adopt or recommend constitutional positions
that run contrary to the weight of judicial precedent or that are likely to be rejected
in litigation. By emphasizing and acquiescing to the power and force of judicial
precedent, DOJ and OLC attorneys curry favor with the courts.32 1
Congress is another institution willing to leave the Constitution to the courts,
pursuing policy preferences without regard to judicial review or the ultimate judicial
constitutional determination as to its law. A judicial declaration that a law is consti-
tutionally invalid offers legislators a new opportunity to take a position on the issue
and to reap the electoral advantages of that position.32 2 The House and Senate Ju-
diciary Committees, charged with overseeing DOJ, are similarly inclined to defer to
judicial interpretation and to court-centric constitutional interpretation.
d. Good Faith Exception to Younger Abstention
Under the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris,323 a federal court cannot
grant an injunction or declaratory judgment that interferes with an ongoing crimi-
nal, civil, or administrative enforcement proceeding.324 Once the government initi-
ates formal enforcement efforts, the rights-holder loses the option of a federal pre-
enforcement action325 or an action for damages;326 she is consigned to asserting con-
stitutional rights defensively in the enforcement proceeding on threat of conviction
and criminal punishment. Younger also limits rights-holders' protections against ex-
ecutive non-compliance with precedent. If the executive initiates enforcement in the
face of unfavorable precedent, the rights-holder loses the strategic option of preemp-
tive federal litigation and with it the drags on non-compliance, such as damages,
319 Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 263, at 755-56; Trammell, supra note 9, at 105-06.
320 28 C.F.R. § 0.25(a) (2019); Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legallnterpretation:A
Perspective from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1303, 1305 (2000).
321 Devins & Prakash, supra note 318, at 510-11.
322 Neil Devins, Why Congress Does Not Challenge judicial Supremacy, 58 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1495, 1536-37 (2017).
323 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971).
324 Middlesex Cry. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 594 (1975); Younger, 401 U.S. at 54.
325 Younger, 401 U.S. at 40-44.
326 Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 860 F.3d 365, 372 (6th Cir. 2017).
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injunctions, and attorneys' fees.
But Younger recognizes an exception-the federal court can enjoin or interfere
with the ongoing enforcement proceeding when that proceeding is brought in bad
faith, without "any expectation of securing valid convictions."
3 27 The bad-faith ex-
ception might limit the executive's departmentalist power to act on an independent
constitutional understanding contrary to controlling judicial precedent. If binding
precedent, controlling on all courts, establishes that a law is constitutionally invalid,
the executive brings the enforcement action without expectation of securing a valid
conviction or judgment. Regardless of the executive's continued good-faith inde-
pendent belief in the law's constitutional validity, the contrary judicial view prevails
in court, which the executive must know. Any conviction that might be secured is
not valid and will not survive review under controlling precedent.
A rights-holder thus can go to federal court to stop a departmentalist executive
from pursuing an enforcement action, unencumbered by the Younger bar. The
rights-holder can obtain an injunction prohibiting the executive from continuing
with the enforcement action if the federal court applies precedent declaring the law
in question constitutionally invalid. The rights-holder may also obtain the added
remedy of attorneys' fees if successful in those constitutional arguments.
D. Voluntary Compliance (or Acquiescence) and the Rhetoric ofJudicial Supremacy
The common strategy for executive and legislative officials is voluntary com-
pliance or acquiescence with judicial precedent, subverting independent constitu-
tional views to the judicial views that almost certainly will prevail in litigation.
Voluntary compliance is so common that the rare example of non-compliance
earned a historic label-"Massive Resistance" to Brown and school desegregation by
southern officials in the 1950s and '60s.328 Three moments from this era illustrate
the reality and contours of judicial departmentalism. The first is President Eisen-
hower sending the 101st Airborne to Little Rock to ensure enforcement of a deseg-
regation order for the Little Rock schools.32 9 The second is Cooper v. Aaron, a case
arising from the desegregation crisis in Little Rock, in which the Court adopted
broad rhetoric of judicial supremacy, insisting:
Compliance with decisions of this Court, as the constitutional organ of the
supreme Law of the Land, has often, throughout our history, depended on
active support by state and local authorities. It presupposes such support. To
withhold it, and indeed to use political power to try to paralyze the supreme
327 Younger, 401 U.S. at 48 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)).
328 KLARMAN, supra note 233, at 326, 368-69, 408-09; Grove, Origins, supra note 230, at
497.
329 KLARMAN, supra note 233, 329, 332-34; supra note 232 and accompanying text.
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Law, precludes the maintenance of our federal system as we have known and
cherished it for one hundred and seventy years.330
The third is Alabama Governor George Wallace standing in the schoolhouse door-
way attempting to prevent African American students from registering at the Uni-
versity of Alabama.331
Properly understood, these events illustrate the fundamental distinctions be-
tween judgments and opinions/precedent and the imperative of particularized in-
junctions.
Despite the common perception, Alabama nd Arkansas officials did not ig-
nore or act contrary to Brown as a judgment because the judgment in Brown did not
affect or control them. Neither the University of Alabama nor the public schools of
Little Rock were at issue in Brown (which arose from a challenge to public-school
segregation in Kansas) or the cases consolidated with Brown (from South Carolina,
Virginia, and Delaware).332 Officials of Alabama and Arkansas were not parties to
those cases. Brown operated only as an opinion and as judicial precedent on the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.
Little Rock and Cooper are more complicated under judicial departmentalism.
The Little Rock School Board attempted to voluntarily comply with Brown's prec-
edent by developing a desegregation plan. New litigation initiated by African Amer-
ican students in Little Rock resulted in a district court order adopting the Board's
plan as a court order, affirmed by the Eighth Circuit, and not appealed to the Su-
preme Court.333 This became an Article-III final judgment with which Arkansas
officials were obligated to comply. When Eisenhower ordered the 101st Airborne to
Little Rock, he was enforcing not Brown, but a new injunction involving schools,
students, and public officials of Little Rock. This is the apotheosis of the presidential
obligation to enforce federal-court judgments and of the reality that judgments and
the judicial power depend on executive enforcement and executive power.
Brown affected Little Rock as the precedent establishing the controlling judicial
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment that compelled the court's new judg-
ment. Had the desegregation plans in Little Rock not produced new litigation and
a new judgment, however, there would have been no legal obligation for Little Rock
officials to allow African American students to attend desegregated schools, nothing
for a court to enforce, and no basis for Eisenhower to deploy the military.
The dispute that reached the Supreme Court in Cooper arose from the Little
330 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 26 (1958); KLARMAN, supra note 233, at 328-29;
Blackman, supra note 1, at 1153.
3' KLARMAN, supra note 233, at 407.
332 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 & n.1 (1954).
333 Cooper, 358 U.S. at 8; Blackman, supra note 1, at 1145.
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Rock School Board's request to delay compliance with the injunction and imple-
mentation of the desegregation plan, in light of "extreme public hostility" to deseg-
regation that rendered it impossible for the Board to create a "sound educational
program" in a high school with African American students.334 The issue before the
Court was whether conditions warranted that delay in compliance, which the Court
easily answered in the negative. 3 3 5 The ode to judicial supremacy and to the obliga-
tion of non-judicial officials to obey judicial precedent was unnecessary dicta that
had nothing to do with the issue before the Court.336 The problem was not that
Arkansas officials such as Governor Orval Faubus ignored Brown. The problem was
that they attempted to ignore a final judgment and injunction that bound them to
act in some way with respect to Little Rock schools; the law of judgments prohibited
such disregard for a court order.337
Judicial departmentalism offers a clearer picture of Wallace standing in the
schoolhouse door. Wallace violated two injunctions-one requiring the University
of Alabama to register the African American students338 and one prohibiting Wal-
lace from interfering with that prior injunction.33 9 As with Little Rock, this was
about Brown only because Brown bound the lower courts in deciding to issue those
injunctions. Brown alone did not give African American students a right to attend
the University of Alabama and did not obligate Wallace to allow them to attend.
His blockade was unlawful because those injunctions prohibited him and other Al-
abama officials from acting in some way as to the individuals seeking to attend the
university.
Cooper is the touchstone for judicial supremacy.340 It also is the touchstone for
critics of judicial supremacy, precisely because the Court's judicial-supremacy rhet-
oric was misplaced and unnecessary.341' The modern norm of executive compliance
with court orders dates to Cooper and to the negative public reaction to Massive
Resistance.342 A more focused Cooper opinion might have formalized that norm
without the confounding, questionable, and debatable resort to the rhetoric of ju-
dicial supremacy.
334 Cooper, 358 U.S. at 12; Blackman, supra note 1, at 1147-50.
3 Cooper, 358 U.S. at 15.
3 Blackman, supra note 1, at 1154-55.
3 Merrill, supra note 161, at 52-53.
3 Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235, 239 (N.D. Ala. 1955).
339 United States v. Wallace, 218 F. Supp. 290, 292 (N.D. Ala. 1963).
3 Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial, supra note 1, at 1362; Blackman, supra note 1, at
1154; Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1293 & n. 124; Merrill, supra note 161, at 52-53; Walsh,
supra note 1, at 1717, 1743.
34' Blackman, supra note 1, at 1191-92; Merrill, supra note 161, at 79; Walsh, supra note 1,
at 1743.
342 Grove, Origins, supra note 230, at 498-99, 531.
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The rhetorical embrace of judicial supremacy enhances the norm of executive
voluntary compliance with judicial precedent, keeping the system flowing and lim-
iting inter-branch conflict.343 One thus might object that embracing judicial depart-
mentalism will prompt less voluntary compliance and produce more inter-branch
conflict. Freed of the public presumption of judicial supremacy and the negative
public connotations of departmentalism, executive officials (at all levels) become less
inclined towards voluntary compliance with judicial precedent. It may render Mas-
sive Resistance less derogatory, less publicly unacceptable, and less to be avoided,
making executive officials more willing to act on independent judgment. This has
the potential to upset all judicial settlement, creating confusion as to what govern-
ment officials and rights-holders are empowered or prohibited from doing.
Departmentalists argue the converse to resist Cooper's rhetorical limits. If exec-
utive officials need not follow judicial precedent, courts may be less anxious to flex
their constitutional muscle and may attend to the views of the more politically ac-
countable branches, limiting themselves to rulings likely to secure voluntary ac-
ceptance by these coordinate branches.34
The answer is not to turn a blind eye to the practical realities of litigation and
adjudication, but to recognize and embrace those realities. Conflict can be mini-
mized through the incentives towards executive compliance-judicial defeat, attor-
neys' fees, damages, sanctions, institutionalism, and executive prudence. Even if the
public accepts the possibility of executive non-compliance, it may be less willing to
accept repeated litigation failures, and the attendant costs, by public officials who
refuse to accept where precedent inevitably leads the courts.
E. The Role of the Legislature
Judicial departmentalism recognizes the legislature's independent power of
constitutional interpretation. The judicial decision declaring a statute constitution-
ally invalid in X prohibits enforcement of the statute only against the plaintiff in X
and lasts as precedent only until the Supreme Court overrules it.345 This preserves a
role for the legislature, which may act on its independent constitutional judgment
in choosing the laws to enact, repeal, or leave in place, regardless of contrary judicial
precedent. Although precedent means any efforts to enforce these laws will fail in
court, the legislature remains unencumbered to make or not make laws as it sees fit.
This puts a different face on past exchanges between legislatures and the judi-
ciary in two directions.
3 Merrill, supra note 161, at 69, 73.
344 Id. at 76-79.
3 Mitchell, supra note 4, at 946-47.
2020] 1135
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
1. Legislating Contrary to Precedent
In 1989, a 5-4 Court in Texas v. Johnson declared that a Texas law banning
"venerated objects" was constitutionally invalid in a criminal prosecution of an in-
dividual who burned an American flag during a political protest.346 Under this
model of constitutional adjudication, the Court produced a judgment prohibiting
Texas from enforcing its flag-burning statute against Johnson arising from his ac-
tions during the 1984 Republican National Convention. It also produced binding
judicial precedent interpreting the First Amendment as protecting flag desecration
as expressive activity and declaring that prohibitions on flag desecration were incon-
sistent with the First Amendment and should not be enforced. But no judgment
prohibited Texas from enforcing its law against another person. Nor did any judg-
ment prohibit another government from enforcing its similar law against anyone.
Congress debated a response to Johnson. Some argued for a constitutional
amendment hat would overrule the Court's decision and establish that the First
Amendment does not protect flag desecration.347 Others pushed for legislation,
which carried the day with passage of the Flag Protection Act, which took effect
later in 1989.348 The law banned all desecration of the flag (including mutilating,
defacing, physically defiling, burning, maintaining on the ground, or trampling),
except for disposal of a worn or soiled flag, for any reason and with any motive or
purpose.349 In United States v. Eichrnan, the same 5-4 majority declared that the
federal statute violated the First Amendment.350 Congress then turned to a consti-
tutional amendment before "[t]he ink had hardly dried on the Eichman opinion,"
35 1
although a proposed amendment fell 34 votes short of the necessary supermajority
in the House and nine votes short in the Senate.
352
As with Johnson, Eichman produced a judgment and precedent. The judgment
dismissed the federal prosecution of Eichman under the federal law. The opinion
established further binding precedent interpreting the First Amendment as protect-
ing flag desecration as expressive activity and declaring that prohibitions on flag
desecration are inconsistent with the First Amendment and cannot be enforced.
Judicial departmentalism offers a different lens on the congressional choice be-
tween statutory or constitutional responses to Johnson, avoiding the simplistic "the
346 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989).
7 ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, FLAG BURNING AND FREE SPEECH: THE CASE OF TEXAS V.
JOHNSON 135-42 (2000).
34' Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 700 (2012)); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 347, at 128-29, 142-43.
3 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1990).
350 Id. at 312, 318-19.
351 Howard M. Wasserman, Holmes and Brennan, 67 ALA. L. REV. 797, 844 (2016).
352 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 347, at 211.
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only alternative is a constitutional amendment" narrative.353 As a matter of the First
Amendment (as distinct from Johnson as judicial precedent interpreting the First
Amendment), a statute was a constitutionally appropriate response, and Congress
had no constitutional obligation to fit the statute within the parameters of Johnson's
language and reasoning. Johnson was judicial precedent-judicial promises354 that
flag-burning statutes would not be applied in court against individuals who invoked
that manner of expression and a prediction of what would happen if the United
States enacted and attempted to enforce a statutory ban.
But Johnson did not compel congressional or executive obeisance. So long as
members of Congress believed the statute was constitutionally valid, they acted con-
sistently with the First Amendment and their constitutional oaths, regardless of con-
trary Supreme Court precedent. And so long as the President and Attorney General
believed the statute valid, they acted consistently with the First Amendment, their
constitutional oaths, and the President's constitutional "Take Care" obligations in
enforcing it.
Devins argues that Congress is more likely than the executive to acquiesce to
judicial supremacy and punt issues to the courts as the arbiter of the Constitution.
After all, "judicial invalidations can prove beneficial, for they create new opportuni-
ties for lawmakers to return to the issue and consider alternative measures."355 The
flag-burning controversy presented that opportunity to Congress, although public
demand for congressional action, intense following Johnson, fizzled following Eich-
man.356 Devins offers an additional example of the Gun Free School Zones Act,
which the Supreme Court declared invalid in 1995 in United States v. Lopez.357 The
Lopez decision provided lawmakers an opportunity to return to the issue and pursue
new legislation, taking a popular public position against crime and in favor of pro-
tecting children.358
The responses to Johnson and to Eichman turn on a rhetorical point. It is not
that any statute is unconstitutional; it is that everyone in Congress knows the statute
will be declared so by courts applying controlling judicial precedent. That is why
Congress necessarily turned to an amendment after Eichman-members predicted
that a new statute would suffer the same fate as the 1989 statute once the dispute
reached the judiciary. But recognizing that judicial departmentalism best describes
the reality of constitutional litigation frees Congress to score those political points
in the face of contrary judicial precedent-enact the new statute and leave it to the
353 Id. at 128-29.
354 Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1008.
355 Devins, supra note 322, at 1522.
356 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 347, at 211-15.
35 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995); Devins, supra note 322, at 28-
29.
3 Devins, supra note 322, at 28-29.
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courts to stop enforcement. Legislators can frame the defeat as competing constitu-
tional interpretations without the rhetorical blowback accusing them of engaging in
Massive Resistance, disobeying the Supreme Court, or acting in an unconstitutional
manner by ignoring the courts. Legislators can score further political points against
activist judges thwarting the public will through an erroneous constitutional under-
standing.
Congress then must grapple with several issues. One is how much it wants to
engage in a back-and-forth with the courts-Congress enacts a statute, the courts
declare it invalid and refuse or enjoin its enforcement, and Congress responds with
the same (or a similar) law that the courts will declare invalid. Another issue is at
what point the DOJ-concerned for its own institutional interests bending towards
judicial supremacy-ceases to enforce or defend a congressional enactment that is
doomed to fail in court under controlling judicial precedent.
359 Executive acquies-
cence with judicial precedent may prompt congressional acquiescence with judicial
precedent. A third issue is how much Congress wants to deal with political or finan-
cial (damages, attorneys' fees, attorney sanctions) consequences of appearing to
waste everyone s time.
Judicial departmentalism adds a new gloss to the 2019 efforts in several states
to enact sharp restrictions on abortion.360 These laws were unquestionably invalid
under controlling Supreme Court precedent as of 2019 and state officials voting for
and attempting to enforce them knew that. The point was to create the litigation
necessary to give the Court the opportunity to overrule precedent by enacting and
threatening to enforce these laws, then appealing their inevitable defeats in the lower
courts.361 Again, this litigation model means these states were not disobeying the
Supreme Court. The starting point was that state officials believed the laws were
constitutionally valid on their best constitutional understanding and interpretation
and they took steps to urge that interpretation on the judiciary. This is how the
system, and the interplay among co-equal branches with shared interpretive author-
ity, operates.
2. Cleaning the Statute Books
Following a judgment, the government may not enforce the challenged law
against X, but may attempt to enforce it against Y or Z, if it is willing to litigate and
lose in court (if it cannot convince the court to abandon precedent) and to shoulder
the attendant consequences. This means Y, Z, and others are not "absolved" of their
35 Devins & Prakash, supra note 318, at 510-11; Merrill, supra note 161, at 73.
360 Tavernise, supra note 19.
361' Governor Ivey Issues Statement After Signing the Alabama Human Life Protection Act, OFF.
GOVERNOR ST. ALA. (May 15, 2019), https://governor.alabama.gov/statements/governor-ivey-
issues-statement-after-signing-the-alabama-human-life-protection-act; see, e.g., Robinson v.
Marshall, No. 2:19cv365-MHT, 2019 WL 5556198 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 29, 2019).
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obligations to follow that statute.362 The law could be enforced against hem, even
if enforcement likely will fail. Eliminating all possible future enforcement requires
legislative action over the content of statute books. The only way to stop the execu-
tive from enforcing or threatening to enforce a constitutionally dubious law, even
one declared invalid by the Supreme Court, is to repeal that law. If a court declares
a law constitutionally invalid and the legislature repeals that law, an executive disa-
greeing with the judicial precedent cannot enforce the law against Y or Z because
there is no law to enforce.
This explains efforts to repeal anti-miscegenation laws and same-sex marriage
bans in states in which such laws remain on the books. As of 2018, three years after
Obergefell, bans on same-sex marriage remained in 30 state constitutions.363 Ala-
bama became the final state to repeal its anti-miscegenation law in 2000, two years
after South Carolina, although the Court declared that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits such laws in 1967.36
This also explains recent efforts in pro-choice states such as New York to clean
their abortion laws following the 2018 appointment of Justice Brett Kavanaugh.
Many states had sharp restrictions on abortion in the 1960s and '70s; although those
laws could not be successfully enforced following Roe v. Wade, they remained on
the books even in states that protected reproductive rights. Facing the prospect of a
five-Justice majority willing to overrule precedent establishing constitutional pro-
tection for abortion, reproductive-freedom advocates have sought to repeal abortion
restrictions to ensure a favorable statutory landscape, even if the constitutional ter-
rain should change.365
Virginia took a more comprehensive approach. It convened a Commission to
Examine Racial Equity in Virginia, which released an interim report in November
2019 identifying and calling for the repeal of dozens of outdated, no-longer-judi-
362 Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1008.
363 josh Barro, Some Practical Thoughts on Gay Marriage After Anthony Kennedy's Retirement,
Bus. INSIDER (June 29, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-does-anthony-kennedy-re-
tirement-mean-for-gay-marriage-2018-6. But see, e.g., Toghill v. Commonwealth, 768 S.E.2d
674, 675 n.1 (Va. 2015) ("The General Assembly amended Code § 182-361(A) in 2014 to re-
move the general provisions forbidding sodomy.").
3 Philip Bump, What Overturning Interracial Marriage Bans Might Tell Us About What
Happens Next with Gay Marriage, WASH. PoST (Oct. 6,2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2014/10/06/what-overturning-interracial-marriage-bans-might-tell-us-about-
what-happens-next-with-gay-marriage/.
36 Blackman, supra note 1, at 1200 & n.518; Joseph Spector & Jon Campbell, Abortion
Laws in New York: How They Changed with the Reproductive Health Act, DEMOCRAT & CHRON.
(Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/politics/albany/2019/01/
22/abortion-laws-new-york-how-they-change-immediately/2643065002/.
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cially enforceable state laws; these included the anti-miscegenation law declared in-
valid and unenforceable in Loving v. Virginia, education laws enacted during Mas-
sive Resistance to Brown, and laws targeting the "feeble-minded." 3
These efforts serve three functions. They are symbolic, removing from the pos-
itive law provisions that the Court has declared are inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion, actual or attempted enforcement of which would fail in court and subject state
officials to suit and a range of judicial remedies. They are expressive-Virginia de-
scribed its efforts to combat its history of racism and racial exclusion by removing
from the positive law provisions that, although not judicially enforceable, send an
historical and continued message of exclusion and the denial of full rights of citizen-
ship and civil participation.3 67 And these efforts have substantive effect. Executive
officials could attempt to enforce those laws if they remain in place and they believe
them constitutionally valid, even in the face of contrary judicial precedent. Although
enforcement efforts would fail in court and are unlikely, they remain within execu-
tive discretion. And the executive remains aware that the Court might overrule prec-
edent, enabling future enforcement. The only way to ensure no enforcement, now
or in the future, is to eliminate the laws.
Repeal efforts must be directed to the legislature. Unfortunately, the presump-
tion and habit of judicial supremacy prompts some advocates to direct these efforts
to the judiciary on the belief that it alone is charged with constitutional enforce-
ment. The Sixth Circuit confronted a skewed version of this in Mason v. Adams
County Recorder.368 The Section 1983 plaintiff sought an injunction ordering the
county recorder of deeds to stop maintaining property deeds containing racially re-
strictive covenants, although such covenants were not enforceable under binding
constitutional precedent69 and no attempt had been made to enforce them.370
In concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing,3 7' the majority described the
claim as one seeking to eliminate legal memory:
'6 INTERIM REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO EXAMINE RACIAL INEQUITY IN VIRGINIA
LAW 12 (2019), https://www.governor.virginia.gov/media/governorvirginiagov/governor-of-vir-
ginia/pdf/Interim-Report-From-the-Commission-to-Examine-Racial-Inequity-in-Virginia-
Law.pdf
67 Id. at 1.
3 Mason v. Adams Cty. Recorder, 901 F.3d. 753, 755 (6th Cir. 2018).
369 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948). The racially restrictive covenants also are
unenforceable under the Federal Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2012),
and a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibiting discrimination because of race with
respect to property. Id. § 1982.
370 Mason, 901 F.3d at 756 (footnote omitted).
371 In part because the plaintiff had not suffered a remediable violation of his constitutional
rights. Mason, 901 F.3d at 757.
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In ancient Rome, the practice of damnatio memoriae, or the condem-
nation of memory, could be imposed on felons whose very existence, in-
cluding destruction of their human remains, would literally be erased from
history for the crimes they had committed. Land title documents with
racially restrictive covenants that we now find offensive, morally reprehen-
sible, and repugnant cannot be subject to damnatio memoriae, as those
documents are part of our living history and witness to the evolution of
our cultural norms. Mason's feeling of being unwelcomed may be real. A
feeling cannot be unfelt. But Mason's discomfort at the expression of his-
torical language does not create particularized injury. The language in
question is purely historical and is unenforceable and irrelevant in present-
day land transactions.372
It might be within the legislative power to enact a law creating new or updated
deeds without the unenforceable restrictive covenants. But the court cannot order
that remedy.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN ACTION
This Part models constitutional litigation and adjudication in light of the prin-
ciples introduced in Parts I through V.
The starting point is a law (federal, state, or local) that has been enacted and is
on the books; for present purposes, form and substance do not matter. The respon-
sible executive officer (or officers) believe the law is enforceable and intend to en-
force it. The law is subject to some constitutional objection by a rights-holder
against whom the law may be enforced.
This framing is generic and abstract, without reference to particular cases, par-
ties, or laws. But it offers a big picture of how this model of constitutional litigation
operates.
A. Initial Constitutional Litigation
Constitutional adjudication against this law may proceed in two ways: 1) de-
fensively, through government-initiated efforts to enforce the challenged law against
the rights-holder's constitutional defense or 2) offensively, in rights-holder-initiated
efforts to stop enforcement of the challenged law. This sub-Part considers both pro-
ceedings, the arguments made, and the results.
1. Enforcement Actions
The government initiates a proceeding against X to enforce the law. The nature
of the proceeding depends on the law enforced and the level of government enforc-
372 Mason, 901 F.3d at 757.
2020] 1141
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
ing it. It could be a criminal prosecution, a civil enforcement action, or an admin-
istrative proceeding, and the government initiating the proceeding could be the
United States or federal agency, a state or state agency, or a municipality or munic-
ipal agency.
Regardless of the nature of the enforcement proceeding, X defends on the
ground that the law is constitutionally invalid-whether because of a structural de-
fect in the law, because the law exceeds internal limits on the powers of the enacting
entity, or because the law violates external limits from individual-rights provisions.
The body adjudicating the enforcement action must interpret the Constitution and
declare the validity of the law enforced. If the adjudicator agrees that the law is
constitutionally invalid, that law cannot be enforced as the rule of decision; the ad-
judicator must dismiss the enforcement efforts or otherwise enter judgment in favor
of X. If the adjudicator declares the law constitutionally valid, the law can be en-
forced as the rule of decision in the action, which then continues to determine
whether X is guilty or liable under the law, given the facts of the case.
If the law is state or municipal and the enforcing authority is a state or munic-
ipality, appeals proceed through the state judiciary with each level given an oppor-
tunity to resolve the federal constitutional question. The Supreme Court can review
the final decision of the highest court of the state to decide the case because the
"validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution" of the United States.373 If the law is federal and the
enforcing authority is the federal government or a federal agency, appeals proceed
from the agency or a federal district court to the regional circuit court of appeals374
and then to the Supreme Court.375
If the last federal court to consider the constitutional question agrees that the
law enforced is constitutionally invalid, the result is an Article 111-final judgment
resolving the enforcement action in X's favor. Judgment in hand, X remains free to
engage in his constitutionally protected conduct, free of interference from the inva-
lid law.
2. Pre-Enforcement Actions
Rather than await an action to enforce that law, X goes on the offensive by
initiating a proceeding in federal district court, naming as defendant the executive
officer (or multiple executive officers) charged with enforcing the challenged law;
the action requests a declaratory judgment that the law is constitutionally invalid,
an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the law as to X, or both. X pursues this
strategy to beat the government to the punch and, where the challenge is to state
373 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2012).
374 Id. § 1291.
3 Id. § 1254(2).
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laws, to move the federal constitutional issues into federal court. This strategic op-
tion is essential to halt enforcement of laws or regulations that are not enforced
through judicial or administrative proceedings (e.g., laws requiring racially segre-
gated schools, prohibiting same-sex marriage, or establishing invalid legislative dis-
tricts).
X must clear several preliminary hurdles for this action. He must establish that
he has standing to bring the action because he has suffered an injury-in-fact traceable
to the defendant official that is redressable via judicial remedy. For present purposes,
X must show that he faces a substantial risk or likelihood that the law will be en-
forced against him by the named defendant official. X also may be unable to pursue
his anticipatory federal civil action if the government has initiated prior to or con-
temporaneous with enforcement proceedings against him.
The federal court can order preliminary or permanent injunctive relief. A per-
manent injunction is a final judgment on the merits following trial, while a prelim-
inary injunction is interlocutory, designed to preserve the status quo and leave the
parties in their current positions pending completion of litigation. Either injunction
requires the same showing by the plaintiff: that he is likely to succeed (or did suc-
ceed) on the merits, that he has no adequate alternative remedy, that he is likely-to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of eq-
uities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. The first
prong focuses on the constitutional claim-success (or likely success) on the merits
means showing that the challenged law is constitutionally invalid and that enforce-
ment of the law against X would violate his rights.
If the district court enjoins enforcement and the injunction is affirmed on ap-
pellate review (or the government does not appeal or the higher courts decline to
review), the injunction becomes Article-III final. Particularity (or non-universality)
now enters the analysis. The injunction may be drafted to prohibit enforcement of
the law by the named defendants along with their officers, agents, servants, employ-
ees, and attorneys, and "other persons who are in active concert or participation."376
This gives the injunction a broad scope as to who it binds-all possible officers who
might participate in enforcement of the challenged law are barred from doing so,
even if not named defendants. The injunction also must state the reasons it was
issued, its terms, and "describe in reasonable detail ... the act or acts restrained or
required."377
The injunction should be particularized to the plaintiff, prohibiting the de-
fendant from enforcing the challenged law only against X. The protective scope can
be expanded if X represents a civil rights injunctive class or if X sues on behalf of its
members or third parties to which it bears a connection. Its scope also can be ex-
panded if the remedial benefits to the plaintiff are indivisible from the benefits to
31 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)C).
37 FED. R. CIv. P. 65(d)(1).
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non-parties, who enjoy incidental spillover effects of X's relief. An injunction is sub-
ject to continued and ongoing judicial supervision to ensure compliance by the de-
fendant and continued protection for the plaintiff.
The federal court may instead issue a declaratory judgment declaring the law
constitutionally invalid and unenforceable as to X but without enjoining defendants
from enforcing it. Should the declaratory judgment fail to persuade the officers, X
can ask the court to issue an injunction in furtherance of the declaratory judgment.
A declaratory judgment should be as particularized as an injunction, limited to de-
claring X's rights and the unenforceability of the law against X.
Having obtained an injunction or declaratory judgment, X is a prevailing party
and is entitled to attorney's fees incurred in pursuing her constitutional challenge.
The federal executive must enforde that federal judgment.
B. Where We Are and What Happens Next
Either the enforcement action or the pre-enforcement action described in Part
VI.A leaves us in the same place-X has prevailed against the government or gov-
ernment officials, obtaining a judgment in his favor. That judgment was accompa-
nied by an opinion explaining that the law is constitutionally invalid and why.
The action shifts to what happens after this initial litigation involving X. Ac-
counting for the five principles discussed, the following must be true.
1. No New Enforcement as to X
If the first proceeding was an enforcement action and X obtained a judgment
in her favor, the government cannot attempt to again enforce the law against X for
the same conduct, as the judgment has preclusive effect. And if the law is criminal,
the judgment triggers protections of Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy.
If the first proceeding was a pre-enforcement action, government and govern-
ment officials are precluded from present and future enforcement as to X. Should
officials attempt enforcement, X could move the district court overseeing the in-
junction to enforce its judgment and to order the officials to comply by not under-
taking prohibited future enforcement. Continued disobedience is punishable by
contempt and sanctions, including fines and jail for the officials. X could assert pre-
clusion in any second enforcement action, arguing that Court II is bound by the
judgment of Court I and must dismiss the enforcement action. At the same time,
government defendants can move to dissolve or modify the injunction when it no
longer is necessary or when the constitutional landscape has changed so the chal-
lenged law again becomes consistent with the Constitution and thus enforceable.
The power to enforce that injunction and to seek sanctions for its disregard is
reserved to X, the party to the litigation that produced the injunction. Enforcing
the injunction to halt future enforcement of the chalenged law may require the
district court to determine the scope of the injunction-who is X and who X repre-
sents. That Y incidentally benefits from the injunction (for example, as another voter
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in an unconstitutionally gerrymandered district) does not allow Y to move the court
to enforce; that power remains with X.
The federal executive branch must enforce that federal court judgment and any
subsequent judicial orders in furtherance of the injunction, including contempt.
This includes taking recalcitrant officials into custody and involving the U.S. Mar-
shals or even the military to ensure compliance with the court order.
2. Enforcement as to Y
The judgment, properly scoped to protect X from enforcement of the chal-
lenged law by that government, does not constrain government officials from doing
anything with respect to Y. The executive can enforce the questionable law against
her, even if she is similarly situated to X. The legislature can enact identical or similar
legislation to be applied to Y. Officials of other governments can make and enforce
identical or similar laws as to Y. Nothing about the judgment in X, even as affirmed
by the Supreme Court, affects the government's conduct towards Y. Because she
was not party to the prior litigation, she is not protected by the judgment. Nor are
executive officers of a different government who were not parties to the prior litiga-
tion and so are not bound or compelled by that judgment to act or refrain from
acting in anyway. These officials do not violate the court's order or the Constitution
through these enforcement efforts if supported by their best constitutional under-
standing. The only requirement is that these officials, in their independent judg-
ments, believe the laws they enact and enforce are constitutionally valid.
The analysis changes if X sued and obtained a judgment in more than an indi-
vidual capacity. If X sued as representative of a certified Rule 23(b)(2) class and Y is
a member of the class, enforcement of the challenged law against them is incon-
sistent with the injunction. If X sued in some third-party or associational capacity
that represented Y, enforcement against Y would be inconsistent with the injunc-
tion. Any question of whether Y is protected by the judgment-and thus whether
enforcement against them violates the injunction-is for the issuing court to resolve
in enforcing its injunction. For example, if X was a doctor asserting third-party
standing to enforce the rights of her patients as against a restriction on abortion, the
enforcement question is whether Y (the target of new enforcement efforts) is one of
those patients protected by the injunction protecting X.
3. Returning to Litigation with Y
Faced with threatened or actual enforcement of the laws or regulations against
her and unprotected by the existing judgment, Y has several options. She may join
as a new plaintiff in Case I and ask the court to extend the injunction to her. She
may ask Court I to certify a class and to extend the injunction to a class of which Y
is a part. Alternatively, Y may initiate her own pre-enforcement litigation, seeking a
new declaration of constitutional invalidity and a new injunction barring enforce-
ment of the challenged law as to her. Or Y may await attempted enforcement of the
law against her and defend the new enforcement action on the grounds of the law's
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constitutional invalidity. Or Y may sue for damages for past injuries arising from
that enforcement; the damages claim must overcome qualified immunity, which
would turn on whether Court I's opinion "clearly established" the constitutional
invalidity of the law.3 78
The law of judgments plays no role in any litigation involving Y, who was not
party to the original action (presuming no class action or other representative litiga-
tion). She is not protected by the existing judgment and cannot enforce it. And,
under current doctrine, she cannot assert non-mutual preclusion against the federal
or state governments. This might change if Clopton and Trammell get their way in
overruling Mendoza and allowing non-mutual offensive preclusion against the gov-
ernment.379 In any event, preclusion requires new litigation involving Y; that litiga-
tion requires the executive to make a valid choice to continue enforcing a law he
believes constitutionally valid, even in the face of contrary precedent-Y cannot
gain preclusion from Court I.
Assuming the initial action was an individual action and injunction, the deci-
sion serves as precedent for Court II in Y's new litigation-a judicial promise of
some nature (whether binding or persuasive) that Y is protected against enforcement
of the law and the duties or restrictions it imposes. How Court II resolves Case II
depends on which courts renders the judgment and opinion in Case I and whether
it produced binding or persuasive authority. If binding, Court II must resolve the
new case in favor of Y; if persuasive, Court II is free to reach its best constitutional
judgment. New litigation offers Y and the government the opportunity to argue
about precedent-what Court I's opinion means, how it applies to a new law or to
new parties, whether there might be differences between the laws or between the
parties that changes the result. The government also can convince Court II (what-
ever level of court) that non-binding authority is legally incorrect or that existing
precedent should be overruled; either results in a judgment from Court II that the
law is constitutionally valid and enforceable against Y.
If Court II concludes that the law is constitutionally invalid (consistent with
precedent from Court I), Y enjoys the same protections and benefits that X enjoyed
following the judgment in his favor.38 o
4. Enforcement and Litigation Against Z
Where does this leave everyone? The cycle begins anew. Binding judgments
prohibit the executive from enforcing the law against X or against Y. But the exec-
utive remains free to enforce the law against Z, triggering everything described above
as to Y. Should Z sue for damages, her claim may be stronger than Y's, because Z
has the benefit of two precedential opinions (from Court I and Court II) to clearly
3 Supra Part V.C.2.a.
1 See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
380 Supra Parts VI.A, VI.B.1.
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establish her constitutional right and thus overcome qualified immunity.
The executive having lost twice, judicial drags on independent executive action
may play a larger role. An official who continues to pursue "lawless" enforcement in
the face of contrary judicial precedent may face political backlash. Government at-
torneys may resist representing the executive and subjecting themselves to judicial
ire at their resistance to judicial precedent. The executive may decide that the point
has come to acquiesce in the judicial understanding and to begin acting accordingly
in its enforcement actions. But this remains a prudential choice, an exercise of the
executive's independent constitutional judgment.
Legislatures engage in their own prudential processes. The laws declared invalid
in Case I (as to X) and Case II (as to Y) remain on the books unless and until the
legislature repeals them. A different legislature can repeal its equivalent law in def-
erence to the prior opinions. But a different legislature also can enact its own law
identical to the one declared invalid and trigger its own enforcement activities, sub-
ject to judicial review and the effect of judicial precedent established in Case I and
Case II. Or the legislature may recognize that the executive will not enforce a law so
contrary to judicial precedent and will refrain from pursuing new legislation. This,
too, remains a prudential choice, an exercise of the legislature's independent consti-
tutional judgment.
The process described is neither efficient nor certain nor attractive to watch.
And the practical reality is that the process rarely, if ever, proceeds beyond the initial
litigation with X, because the executive and legislative branches rarely, if ever, assert
their independent constitutional judgment. Or X follows appropriate procedural
mechanisms to properly expand the scope of her injunction and judgment.
Nevertheless, the system benefits from a clearer and more accurate understand-
ing of the judicial, political, and constitutional processes underlying and driving
constitutional litigation and adjudication.
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